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I.
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties to the proceedings are named in the caption.
Cited statutes and procedural rules are set forth in the
Appendix.
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IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does due process of law require a court, pursuant to Rule
60, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to vacate an order entered in
violation of adopted procedural rules?
2.

Is it an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse

to grant relief under Rule 60, U.R.C.P., from an order obtained
through violation of procedural rules?
3.

Are the Rules of Civil Practice set forth as Article 5 of

the Utah Code of Judicial Administration "rules of practice" which
are binding on litigants?
V.
OFFICIAL REPORTS
This case was decided by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion dated July 29, 1992 (attached as Exhibit A ) .
VI.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The revised opinion of the Court of Appeals on rehearing was
filed July 29, 1992. This court signed an order dated August 25,
1992

extending

the date

for

filing

Certiorari to September 8, 1992.

a petition

for Writ of

(Exhibit B ) .

This court has jurisdiction to grant Certiorari pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
1

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Seven and a half months following entry of judgment in the
trial court and seven months after notice of appeal was filed in
this case, defendant, Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (hereinafter "Fidelity"), filed an order with the trial court which
purported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion.

Due to a filing error,

plaintiff's counsel was unaware the order had been submitted or
signed until Fidelity, in its reply brief, suggested the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal because a new notice
of appeal had not been filed.
dismissed

the

case.

See,

The Court of Appeals agreed and

DeBry

v.

Fidelity

National

Title

Insurance Co., 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992) (hereinafter
referred to as "Fidelity I") (copy attached as Exhibit D ) .
Upon receipt of appellees' brief raising the jurisdictional
issue, the DeBrys filed a Rule 60 motion in the trial court to
amend or vacate the order.

(Exhibit E ) .

Plaintiff claimed:

a)

No Rule 52(b) motion was ever filed by plaintiff;

b)

The order denying the purported Rule 52(b) motion was
obtained by a systematic violation of procedural rules;

c)

Fidelity should not be rewarded for violating procedural
rules by having the DeBrys' appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.

Judge Brian denied the Rule 60 motion.
tiffs appealed. (Exhibit G.)
2

(Exhibit F ) . Plain-

In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals summarily
dismissed the appeal.
which was granted.
filed July 29, 1992.

(Exhibit H ) .
(Exhibit I) .

Plaintiffs sought a rehearing
A new unpublished opinion was

(Exhibit A ) .

The gist of the Appeals Court's ruling is that:
a)

The issue of whether the plaintiff filed a Rule 52(b)
motion was ruled on in Fidelity I; and

b)

The Rules of Practice set forth in Article 5 of the Utah
Code of Judicial Administration do not rise to the level
of procedural rules which are binding on the court or
counsel, and, therefore, the DeBrys were not prejudiced
by Fidelity's violations of these rules or by the Trial
Court's neglect to follow them.

The issues in this appeal are whether the rules set forth in
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are binding on litigants
and rise to the level of procedural rules which can be relied on by
counsel and the courts in conducting litigation; and whether due
process is offended if a court refuses to amend or vacate an order
obtained by violation of procedural rules.
VIII.
FACTS
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. and certified the
case for appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P.

3

Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand
delivered proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to the DeBrys' counsel. (See Exhibit C, Appendix).
On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment on all other
counsel in the case. (Exhibit J, Appendix).
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings and
judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit K, Appendix).
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys' counsel filed objections to the
form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.

(Exhibit L ) .

Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit M, Appendix).

For the next seven

months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b)
Motion.
Approximately seven months after Notice of Appeal was filed,
Fidelity, ex parte. obtained the signature of the trial court on an
order which purported to deny a Rule 52(b) motion to alter or amend
the May 2, 1990 Judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix).
Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990 order,
(Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal.
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Eight months later when Fidelity filed its brief in the Court
of Appeals, it (for the first time) claimed that the Court of
Appeals had no jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its
merits because there was no notice of appeal filed following entry
of the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F).
in Fidelity I at Point I.

See Appellees* Brief

(Exhibit N, Appendix).

The Court of Appeals accepted Fidelity's argument and dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits. DeBry v. Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App.
1992) .

(Exhibit C) .

That decision is before this court in a

petition for writ of certiorari filed in Fidelity I.
Meanwhile, upon discovery of the December 11 order by receipt
of appellees' brief, plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate or amend
the December 11, 1990 order.
(Exhibit O) .

(Exhibit E) . This motion was denied.

Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion.

(Exhibit G) . (This appeal is referred to hereafter as "Fidelity
II") .
Prior to briefing the appeal in Fidelity II, the Court of
Appeals on its own motion asked for memoranda from the parties on
the issue of summary disposition.

(Exhibit P ) .

The DeBrys filed a memorandum explaining why summary disposition was improper.

(Exhibit Q).

The Court of Appeals issued an

opinion on June 17, 1992, summarily dismissing the appeal in
Fidelity II.

(Exhibit H).

Because the DeBrys felt the Court of
5

Appeals had glossed over important issues, a petition for rehearing
was filed.

(Exhibit R).

Rehearing was granted.

new unpublished opinion was filed.

(Exhibit I).

A

(Exhibit A ) .

The DeBrys seek review of the revised opinion of the Court of
Appeals in Fidelity II by filing this petition.
IX.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CIVIL PRACTICE RULES OF THE UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION ARE
BINDING PROCEDURAL RULES
In its unpublished opinion in this case, the Court of Appeals
has ruled that the civil practice rules set forth in Article 5 of
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration do not have the effect of
procedural rules which are binding on litigants and the court.
July 29 Opinion at 3 (Exhibit A).

The effect of this ruling is to

hold that the published civil practice rules are not binding on
litigants and can be violated without consequence.

Thus, a

litigant cannot rely on the other parties following the rules
because the Court of Appeals says they exist merely to provide
"guidance."

.Id.

This ruling flies in the face of the Rules

themselves which state their intent to be:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing
motions, supporting memoranda and documents
with the court.
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
6

The introduction to the Code of Judicial Administration
(Exhibit S) states that the Rules have been adopted by the Supreme
Court and Judicial Counsel for the purpose of creating a uniform
procedure in the courts. The provisions of the Rules allow counsel
to rely on receiving notices of actions taken by opposing counsel
which may affect their clients' rights.
The ruling of the Court of Appeals in this case, that these
rules are not "rules of procedure" which can be relied upon by the
parties, is in direct conflict with the introductory language of
the code (Exhibit S). Counsel should be able to rely on litigants
following these rules.
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495
P.2d 1262 (1972) this court defined due process of law as:
[A] course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the enforcement and protection of private
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324.
This court adopted the Civil Practice Rules contained in the
Code of Judicial Administration. Due process constraints preclude
a ruling which arbitrarily states the rules do not apply. Parties
have a right to rely on practice and procedure rules being enforced
as written.

E.g.. Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d

662 (1966); Schleinina v. Estate of Morris. 431 P.2d 464, 466
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d
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187 (Colo. 1968); Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. 1,
286 S.E.2d 810 (1982).
Certiorari should be granted so this court can clarify the
applicability of the Civil Practice Rules and to determine whether
due process of law under the Federal and Utah Constitutions allow
a party to rely on the Civil Practice Rules being followed as the
proper means of conducting litigation.
Another reason why Certiorari should be granted in this issue
is that the Court of Appeals has ruled the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rules are not binding in an unpublished opinion
which has no precedential effect.

The unpublished opinion denies

the DeBrys a hearing on the merits of their claim.

Certiorari

should be granted so this court can define in a published opinion
whether or not the Civil Practice Rules, which were adopted by this
Court, are procedural rules which bind litigants in the State of
Utah.
POINT II
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS INAPPROPRIATE
The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the refusal of the
trial court to amend its December 11, 1990 order pursuant to Rule
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

In so doing it stated:

We summarily affirm on the basis that the
appeal presents no substantial issue for
review.
Unpublished Opinion of July 29, 1992 at 1. (Exhibit A)
Substantial legal issues, including a constitutional claim of
denial of due process, were presented to the Court of Appeals and

ignored.

This Court should exercise its supervisory power to

consider the refusal of the Court of Appeals to hear these issues.
The following substantial issues were presented in the DeBrys*
appeal in Fidelity II.
A.

Fidelity Obtained the December 11. 1990 Order by Violating
Specific Procedural Rules.
The December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit N) was obtained through

procedural violations of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration as follows:
1.

Violation of Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides:
The trial court need not enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b).

Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
Following granting of Fidelity's motion for summary judgment,
Fidelity submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support the summary judgment.

This was a violation of Rule 52(a)

because findings and conclusions are not proper or necessary to
support summary judgment.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph

Co. v. Atkin. Wriaht. & Miles. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

This

uncalled for submission triggered plaintiff to file objections to
the findings, conclusions and order.
2.

Violations of Rule 4-504f2) Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4-504(2) provides:
9

(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be served upon
opposing counsel before being presented to the
court for signature unless the court otherwise
orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service.
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines the method of
calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of the
Rules.
Fidelity violated these rules as follows:

The proposed

findings, conclusions and judgment were delivered to plaintiff
April 24, 1990 (Exhibits C, J ) .

They were mailed to all other

counsel April 25, 1990 (Exhibit J ) .

Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),

using Rule 6 time computations, the last day for filing objections
to the form of the judgment was May 7, 1992.

Fidelity submitted

the order early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 6.

The

judge signed the order prior to the time allowed for objections.
(Exhibit K ) .
Plaintiffs' counsel prepared and signed objections to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they
were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990.

(Exhibit L).

If Fidelity had

not violated procedural rules and submitted the order early, no
question would have arisen as to whether plaintiffs' objections
were a Rule 52(b) motion. The confusion was created by Fidelity's
rules violations.

10

3.

Violation of Rule 4-504(4) Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

Rule 4-504(4) provides:
(4) Upon entry of judgment notice of such
judgment shall be served upon the opposing
party and proof of such service shall be filed
with the court. All judgments, orders, and
decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be
transmitted after signature by the judge,
including other correspondence requiring a
reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed
envelopes and pre-paid postage.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity.
When plaintiffs' objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May
7,

1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the

judgment. When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed
May 2, 1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were
moot1 and filed a notice of appeal.
4.

Violation of Rule 4-501(lWb) of the Code of Judicial
Administration.

Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides:
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all
parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the
motion, and all supporting documentation. If
the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to a motion within ten
days after service of the motion, the moving
party may notify the clerk to submit the
'A pleading filed out of time has no force or effect.
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina. 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988).
11

See.

matter to the court for decision as provided
in paragraph (1)(d) of this rule.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
If in fact the DeBrys1 objections (Exhibit L) were a Rule
52(b) motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule
requires a response in opposition within ten days.
responded.

4-501(1)(b)

Fidelity never

When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it

waived any right to submit the motion for decision.

Violation of

this rule denied to plaintiff notice that Fidelity thought a Rule
52(b) motion was pending or that Fidelity opposed such a motion.
5.

Violation of Rule 4-501(1)(d).

Rule 4-501(1)(d), Code of Judicial Administration provides:
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a
reply memorandum, either party may notify the
Clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision. The notification shall be in the
form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision."
The notification shall contain a certificate
of mailing to all parties. If neither party
files a notice, the motion will not be
submitted for decision.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
Assume, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending.

If

Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to
submit for decision.

If we assume a violation of Rule 4-501(1)(b)

did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the motion for decision,
Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d) which denied notice
12

to DeBrys that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b) motion was pending or
under consideration for a decision.
6.

Violations of Rule 4-504(1).
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the
party or parties obtaining the ruling shall
within fifteen days, or within a shorter time
as the court may direct, file with the court a
proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.

Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after
a ruling of the court.

Fidelity violated this rule when it

submitted the December 11, 1990 order for signature.

There had

been no ruling from the court and no request for a ruling.

The

previous rules violations had denied notice to the DeBrys that
Fidelity thought there was a pending unresolved motion.

If the

DeBrys had been put on such notice, they would have been aware
response to a Rule 52(b) motion was underway and a new notice of
appeal could have been timely filed.
7.

Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4).

In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in
paragraph

3 above, Fidelity

again violated

Rule

4-504(4)

as

follows:
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again
violated Rule 4-504(4) by not notifying DeBrys of entry of the
13

order.

This denied to DeBrys a notice which would have triggered

the duty to file a new notice of appeal which would have avoided
dismissal of Fidelity I.
The numerous flagrant rules violations of Fidelity caused the
procedural confusion in the case.

Being seven months into the

appeal, counsel was not expecting to receive an ex parte order
which would require a new notice of appeal to be filed. The small
mistake in plaintiffs office which denied counsel notice of the
submission of the December 11, 1990 order, is inconsequential when
compared to the numerous and continued violations of rules by
Fidelity in obtaining entry of the December 11, 1990 order.
Since DeBrys' counsel was unaware of the entry of the December
11, 1990 order, no new Notice of Appeal was filed in Case No.
910329.

Failure to file a new Notice of Appeal resulted in

dismissal of case 910329.

See, DeBry v. Fidelity National Title

Co.. 182 Utah Adv.Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992).
Immediately upon learning of the December 11, 1990 order,
plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 motion to amend or vacate the order to
eliminate references to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court denied the motion and this appeal was filed.
The net result of Fidelity's rules violations was to confer a
benefit upon Fidelity when Fidelity I was dismissed because of a
procedural technicality.

Thus Fidelity has been greatly rewarded

for violating procedural rules.
14

Counsel claimed to the trial court that rules violations by
Fidelity resulted in the DeBrys being denied notices which would
have put them on notice of Fidelity's concern a Rule 52(b) motion
was pending.

See. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order

dated September 27, 1991 at 4-5; and Reply to Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion to Amend Order dated December 16, 1991 at 4-5.
(Exhibit E).
The unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals glossed over
the procedural due process issues raised by petitioner and based
upon a ruling that the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rules
are not binding, granted summary approval to the acts of the trial
court.
Certiorari should be granted to allow these due process issues
to be briefed and decided by this Court.
B.

The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Refusing to Vacate or
Amend the December 11. 1990 Order. Due to Fidelity's Procedural Violations and Thereby Denied the DeBrvs Due Process of
Law.
Almost seven months after notice of appeal was filed in

Fidelity I. Fidelity obtained the trial court's signature on the
December 11, 1990 order. (Exhibit F).

This order was the culmi-

nation of numerous specific violations by Fidelity of procedural
rules.

See. Point 11(A), supra. Fidelity's procedural violations

effectively denied the DeBrys due process of law.

Had Fidelity

followed the procedural rules, DeBrys would have had numerous
15

notices and opportunities to reply to Fidelity's contention that a
Rule 52(b) motion was pending.

However, Fidelity did not follow

the Rules and DeBrys were denied these notices which resulted in a
denial of an opportunity to respond.
In Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966),
the Supreme Court held that procedural rules:
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate
justice, nevertheless, they were designed to
provide a pattern of regularity of procedure
which the parties and the courts could follow
and rely upon. 18 Utah 2d at 76. (Emphasis
added).
In Lloyd v. Third Judicial District Court, 27 Utah 2d 322, 495
P.2d 1262 (1972) the Supreme Court defined due process of law as:
[A] course of legal proceedings according to
those rules and principles which have been
established in our systems of jurisprudence
for the enforcement and protection of private
rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324.
The orderly administration of justice (due process) requires
compliance with procedural rules. Llovd v. Third Judicial District
Court. supra; Scott v. McNeal. 154 U.S. 34

(1894); Drurv v.

Lunceford. supra; Mayland v. State. 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977).
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or a
party. Mayland v. State, supra. The disregard of procedural rules
by a trial court cannot be countenanced.

Mesa v. Washington State

Department of Social and Health Services. 683 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.
1982).

Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings

where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g.. Conner
16

v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982)
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake. 447 N.E.2d
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner. 10 Ohio App.3d 328,
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d
187 (Colo. 1968) ; Schleininq v. Estate of Morris, supra; Thomas v.
Children's Hospital Ass'n. 535 P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v.
Jammaron. 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo. App. 1983).
A party has a right to rely on application of the rules as
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written.
E.g. f Drury v. Lunceford, supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain,
supra; Motz v. Jammaron. supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co. . supra.

Due process of law requires following the regular

course of proceedings.

Simon v. Craft. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).

In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en banc stated in
Schleininq v. Estate of Morris, supra:
The trial court should have adhered to its own
published rules.
The departure here constituted an abuse of its discretion. 431 P.2d
at 466.
Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion when it enters an
order in violation of procedural rules.

Id;

see. Armstrong v.

Lake, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. supra; Capitol
Industrial Bank v. Strain, supra.
The test for reversal in this case is abuse of discretion.
Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989).

If it is an abuse

of discretion to enter an order in violation of procedural rules,
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then it follows that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to
amend or vacate an order entered in violation of procedural rules.
Schleining v. Estate of Morris, supra.
By summarily disposing of this appeal based on an issue never
raised by the parties (i.e., the Code of Judicial Administration is
non-binding see Point I, supra), the Court of Appeals denied the
DeBrys the opportunity to brief and argue the due process and abuse
of discretion issues. The questions of whether the Civil Practice
Rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration are binding rules
which can be relied upon by counsel in conducting litigation, and
whether failure to adhere to procedural rules, which failure denies
notice of a pending proposed order, is a denial of due process of
law, are substantial questions which should not have been decided
on summary disposition.

Certiorari should be granted to allow

these issues to be briefed, argued and properly decided by this
court.
POINT III
THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO GIVE THIS APPEAL
THE CONSIDERATION TO WHICH IT IS ENTITLED BY LAW
This appeal (Fidelity II) is based upon a claim that the trial
court abused its discretion and denied to the DeBrys due process of
law when it refused to amend or vacate the December 11, 1990 Order.
(Exhibit N ) .
On its own motion, the Court of Appeals notified the parties
it was considering summary disposition.
18

(Exhibit P) .

Counsel

responded informing the court of the substantial due process and
procedural violations issues extant in the appeal.

(Exhibit Q ) .

Following this submission, the Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
the trial court in an unpublished opinion dated June 17, 1992.
(Exhibit H ) .
Arguing the June 17, 1992 Opinion (Ex. H) was based upon
erroneous assumptions, counsel sought a rehearing.

(Exhibit R.)

Upon realizing that the factual basis for their first opinion
(Exhibit H) was erroneous, the Court of Appeals still refused to
allow the issues to be briefed and argued.

It issued a second

unpublished opinion on July 29, 1992 (Exhibit A) claiming there
were no substantial issues presented.

Such a holding glosses over

the substantial constitutional arguments raised by petitioners in
this appeal.
1.

These are:
Refusal to follow procedural rules is a denial of
due process.

2.

Point 11(B) supra; and

The Civil Practice Rules of the Utah
Judicial
rules.

Administration
Point I, supra.

are

binding

Code of

procedural

(an issue never raised by

the parties).
These issues were not properly briefed.
argued to the court.

They were never

In view of the facts set forth herein, a

statement that there were no substantial issues for review is
ludicrous.
19

X.
CONCLUSION
The unpublished opinion in this case emasculates the Civil
Practice Rules of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.

It

also denies plaintiffs their constitutional right to have the
issues raised in their appeal considered following proper briefing
and argument.

The acts of the trial court denied petitioners due

process of law.

A claim of a constitutional violation is not one

which should be denied on summary disposition.

For these reasons,

Certiorari should be granted in this case.
DATED this

H—

day of September, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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(2) On January 1, 1992, the circuit courts in the
Fifth. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Distncts are established as district courts in those municipalities where
the circuit courts currently are located Circuit court
judges of these judicial districts shall be district court
judges as of that date Judges of these districts shall
-tand for unopposed retention election as required by
law
(3) The authority of the Judicial Council to replace
a vacant circuit court judicial position with a court
lommibsioner position within the limits established
under Subsection t1) shall expire January 1.1996
1991 (2nd S.S )

78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions.
11) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose
election to office was effective on or before July 1.
i9S5, shall hold the office for the remainder of the
term to which he was elected The justice or judge is
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided
bv law at the general election immediately preceding
the expiration of the respective term of office
12) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective on or before July
1 1985. is subject to an unopposed retention election
as provided by law at the first general election held
more than three years after the date of the appointment
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose
appointment to office was effective after July 1,1985,
is subject to an unopposed retention election as provided by law at the first general election held more
than three years after the date of the appointment
1988

CHAPTER 2
SUPREME COURT
Section
78-2-1.

Number of justices — Terms — Chief
justice and associate chief justice —
Selection and functions.
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1 6 Repealed
78-2-2
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
78-2-3.
Repealed
78-2-4
Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law
78-2-5
Repealed
78-2-6
Appellate court administrator.
78-2-7
Repealed
78-2-7 5
Service of sheriff to court
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and associate chief justice — Selection and functions.
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed initially to serve until the first general election held more than three years after the effective
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office
of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and
commences on the first Monday in January following
the date of election. A justice whose term expires may
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a
successor is appointed and qualified.
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
chief justice from among the members of the court by
a majority vote of all justices The term of the office of
chief justice is four years The chief justice may serve
successive terms The chief justice may resign from
the office of chief justice without resigning from the

78-2-2

Supreme Court The chief justice may be removed
from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all
justices of the Supreme Court
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
chief justice is elected under this section If tne associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
duties as provided by law
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice The term of office of the associate chief justice is
two years The associate chief justice mav serve in
that office no more than two successive terms The
associate chief justice shall be elected bv a majority
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines If
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice The chief justice may delegate responsibilities
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law
1990

78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed.

1971. 1981

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over'
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals,
(el discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with(i) the Public Service Commission;
(u) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
dv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a cnarge of a first degree or capital felony,
d) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does
not have original appellate jurisdiction.

78-2-3
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(4) The Supreme Court mav transfer to the Court
of Appeals anv of the matters o \ e r which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except
(a) capital felonv convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutor) order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital felony
(b> election and voting contests,
ic) reapportionment of election districts
(di retention or removal of public officers, and
(ei those matters described in Subsections
(3ua> through (di
(51 The Supreme Court h a s sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
foi t h e review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but
the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it b \ the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b)
(6' The Supreme Court shall compK with the requirements of Title 63 Chapter 46b, in its re\ lew of
asrencv adjudicative proceedings
1992
78-2-3.

Repealed.

1986

78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1i The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of t h e state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
e\ idence adopted bv t h e Supreme Court upon a vote
of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature
(21 Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution t h e Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform a m judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, U t a h residents, and
admitted to practice lav> in U t a h
(31 The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of lav., including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals The
duties of the clerks and support staff shall be established b\ the appellate court administrator and
powers established b\ rule of the Supreme Court
1986

78-2-7. Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff t o court.
The court m a \ at a n \ time require the attendance
and services of any sheriff in the state
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed.

1986. 1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l
78-2a-2
78-2a-3
78-2a-4
78-2a-5

Creation — Seal
Number ofjudges — Terms — Functions
— Filing fees
Court of Appeals jurisdiction
Review of actions b> Supreme Court
Location of Court of Appeals
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78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Ap
peals The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal
1986
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing fees
111 The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges
The term of appointment to office as a judge of the
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more than three vears after the effective date of
the appointment Thereafter the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monaav in Januarv, next following the date of election A judge whose term expires
ma> serve upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1 000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served
(21 The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges Assignment to panel.-,
shall be bv random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals The Court of Appeals bv rule shall pro
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms The Court of Appeals mav b\ rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge
(41 The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge bv majontv vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels,
(bi act as liaison with the Supreme Court
(c» call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals, and
id) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are tne
same as for the Supreme Court
1988
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(11 The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary
la) to carry into effect its judgments, orders
and decrees or
lb) in aid of its jurisdiction
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission. Board of State Lands, Board of Oil
Gas, and Mining and the state engineer
(b) appeals from the district court review of
(D adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and
(n) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12 1,
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Rule 4-408. Locations of trial courts of record.
Intent:
To designate locations of trial courts of record.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Each county seat and the following municipalities are hereby designated as locations of trial courts
of record: American Fork: Bountiful; Cedar City;
Clearfield; Kaysville; Layton: Murray; Orem; Park
City; Roosevelt; Roy; Salem; Sandy; Spanish Fork;
West Valley City.
(2) Subject to limitations imposed by law, a trial
court of record of any subject matter jurisdiction may
hold court in any location designated by this rule.
(Added effective January 1, 1992.)
ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions,
supporting memoranda and documents with the
court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts except proceedings before the
court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to
petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
la) Motion and supporting memoranda. All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters,
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and
copies of or citations by page number to relevant
portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion shall not
exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court
on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum,
the application shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is in
excess of ten pages, the application shall include
a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed
five pages.
ib1 Memorandum in opposition to motion.
The responding party shall file and serve upon
all parties within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion,
and all supporting documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the moving party may notify
the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (lKdi of this
rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party
may serve and file a reply memorandum within
five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.

Rule 4-501

(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk
to submit the matter to the court for decision.
The notification shall be in the form of a separate
written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain a
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment.
la) Memorandum in support of a motion.
The points and authorities in support of a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a section
that contains a concise statement of material
facts as to which movant contends no genuine
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer
to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment shall begin with
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or
sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed.
All material facts set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for
the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
••
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered
without a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or
requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b> or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action or any issues in the
action on the merits with prejudice, either party
at the time of filing the principal memorandum
in support of or in opposition to a motion may file
a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the
court finds that (a) the motion or opposition to
the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or
denial of the motion has been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the
court shall notify the requesting party. When a
request for hearing is granted, the court shall set
the matter for hearing or notify the requesting
party that the matter shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and
time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of
points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered
to the judge hearing the matter at least two
working days before the date set for hearing.
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies
and indicate the date and time of the hearing.
Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk
of the court.

Rule 4-502
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(f) If no written request (or a hearing is made
at the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(gi All dispositive motions shall be heard at
least thirty (301 days before the scheduled trial
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause shown, the court may grant a
request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the
provisions of this rule would be impracticable or
where the motion does not raise significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own
motion or at a party's request may direct arguments
of any motion by telephone conference without court
appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all
telephone arguments and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-502. Discovery procedures in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for the filing of discovery
documents.
To establish a limitation on discovery procedures
within 30 days of trial.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Juvenile and
Circuit Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(li Parties conducting discover}' under Rules 33,
34 and 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall
not file discovery requests with the clerk of the court,
but shall file only the original certificate of service
stating that the discovery requests have been served
on the other parties and the date of service. The responding party shall file a similar certificate with the
clerk of the court.
(2) The party serving the discover}' request shall
retain the original with a copy of the proof of service
affixed to it and serve a copy of the discovery request
and proof of service upon the opposing party or counsel. The party responding to the discovery request
shall retain the original with a copy of the proof of
service affixed to it, and serve a copy of the responses
and the proof of service upon the opposing party or
counsel. The discover}- requests and response shall
not be filed with the clerk of the court unless the
court on motion and notice and for good cause shown
so orders.
(3) Any party filing a motion to compel compliance
with a discover}' request or a motion which relies
upon the discovery response shall attach a copy of the
discover}' request or response which is at issue in the
motion.
(4) Depositions taken pursuant to the Rules of
Civil Procedure shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court except as provided in this Code or upon order of
the court for good cause shown.
(5) All parties shall be entitled to conduct discover}' proceedings in accordance with this rule. All discovery proceedings shall be completed, including all
responses thereto, and all depositions and other documents filed with the court no later than thirty (30)
days before the date set for trial of the case. The right
to conduct discovery proceedings within thirty (30)
days before trial shall be within the discretion of the
court. Motions to conduct discovery within thirty (30)
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days before trial shall be presented to the judge assigned to the case upon notice to the other parties in
the action. In exercising its discretion, the coun shall
take into consideration the necessity and reasons for
such discover}', the diligence or lack of diligence of
the parties seeking such discovery, whether permitting such discover}- will prevent the case from going
to trial on the scheduled date, or result in prejudice to
any party. Nothing herein shall preclude or limit the
voluntary exchange of information or discovery by
stipulation of the parties at any time prior to the date
set for trial, but in no event shall such exchanges or
stipulations require a court to grant a continuance of
the trial date.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-503. Requests for jury instructions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
and requesting jury instructions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District, Circuit and
Justice Courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All jury instruction requests shall be presented
to the court five days prior to the scheduled trial date
unless otherwise ordered by the court. The court, in
its discretion, may allow the presentation of jury instructions at any time prior to the submission of the
case to the jury. At the time of presentation to the
court, a copy of the requested instructions shall be
furnished to opposing counsel.
(2) Jury instruction requests must be in writing
and state in full the instruction requested. Each request shall be upon a separate sheet of paper, the
original and copies of which shall be free from red
lines and (Irm names and shall be entitled:
"Instruction No.

"

The number of the request shall be written in lead
pencil.
(3) If case citations are used in support of a requested instruction, at least one copy of the requested
instruction, furnished to the court shall be submitted
without the citations. Citations may be provided upon
separate sheets attached to the particular instruction
to which the citation applies.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)
Rule 4-504. Written orders, judgments and decrees.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for submitting
written orders, judgments, and decrees to the court.
This rule is not intended to change existing law with
respect to the enforceability of unwritten agreements.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all civil proceedings in
courts of record except small claims.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the parry
or parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen
days, or within a shorter time as the court may direct,
file with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in conformity with the ruling.
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before
being presented to the court for signature unless the
court otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be
submitted to the court and counsel within five days
after service.
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(3) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall
also be reduced to writing and presented to the court
for signature within fifteen days of the settlement
and dismissal.
(4) Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment shall be served upon the opposing party and
proof of such service shall be filed with the court. All
judgments, orders, and decrees, or copies thereof,
which are to be transmitted after signature by the
judge, including other correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by pre-addressed envelopes
and pre-paid postage.
(5) All orders, judgments, and decrees shall be prepared in such a manner as to show whether they are
entered upon the stipulation of counsel, the motion of
counsel or upon the court's own initiative and shall
identify the attorneys of record in the cause or proceeding in which the judgment, order or decree is
made.
(6) Except where otherwise ordered, all judgments
and decrees shall contain the address or the last
known address of the judgment debtor and the social
security number of the judgment debtor if known.
(7) All judgments and decrees shall be prepared as
separate documents and shall not include any matters by reference unless otherwise directed by the
court. Orders not constituting judgments or decrees
may be made a part of the documents containing the
stipulation or motion upon which the order is based.
(8) No orders, judgments, or decrees based upon
stipulation shall be signed or entered unless the stipulation is in writing, signed by the attorneys of record
for the respective parties and filed with the clerk or
the stipulation was made on the record.
(9) In all cases where judgment is rendered upon a
written obligation to pay money and a judgment has
previously been rendered upon the same written obligation, the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel shall attach
to the new complaint a copy of all previous judgments
based upon the same written obligation.
(10) Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit
the power of any court, upon a proper showing, to
enforce a settlement agreement or any other agreement which has not been reduced to writing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-505. Attorneys' fees affidavits.
Intent:
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format
for affidavits in support of attorneys' fees.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees
in the trial courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys'
fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the nature of the
work performed by the attorney, the number of hours
spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time
spent in pursuing the matter to the stage for which
attorneys' fees are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal services.
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours
by persons other than attorneys, for time spent, work
completed and hourly rate billed.
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following phrase
may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the time spent to the point of default

Rule 4-505.1

judgment, to cover additional fees incurred in pursuit
of collection:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT
THIS JUDGMENT SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
EXPENDED IN COLLECTING SAID
JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY
AFFIDAVIT."
(4) Judgments for attorney's fees should not be
awarded except as they conform to the provisions of
this rule and to state statute and case law.
(Amended effective January 15. 1990.)
Rule 4-505.1. Awards of attorneys' fees in civil
default judgments with a principal
amount of $5,000 or less.
Intent:
To provide for uniformity in awards of attorneys'
fees in civil default judgments with a principal
amount of 55,000 or less.
To provide for notice of the amount of attorneys'
fees that may be awarded in the event of default.
Applicability:
This rule shall govern awards of attorneys' fees in
civil default judgments with a principal amount of
$5,000 or less in which the claimant elects to seek an
award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) When reasonable attorneys' fees are provided
for by contract or statute and the claimant elects to
seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule,
such fees shall be computed as follows:
Principal Amount of
Judgment,
Exclusive of Costs,
Between:
$ 0.00 S 700.00
700.01
900.00
900.01
1,000.00
1,000.01
1.500.00
1,500.01
2,000.00
2,000.01
2.500.00
2.500.01
3,000.00
3,000.01
3.500.00
3,500.01
4.000.00
4,000.01
4.500.00
5,000.00
4,500.01

Attorneys' Fees
Allowed
$150.00
175.00
200.00
250.00
325.00
400.00
475.00
550.00
625.00
700.00
775.00

(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorneys' fees allowed pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be
stated with particularity in the body or prayer of the
complaint.
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award
of attorneys' fees, reference to the statutory authority
shall be included in the complaint.
(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which
include attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule.
(5) Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule
may be augmented after judgment pursuant to Rule
4-505. When the court considers a motion for augmentation of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this
rule, it shall consider the attorneys' time spent prior
to the entry of judgment, the amount of attorneys'
fees included in the judgment, and the statements
contained in theaffidavit supporting the motion for
augmentation.
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule, any party may move
the court to depart from the fees allowed by para-
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graph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made
pursuant to Rule 4-505.
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an
award of attorneys' fees, an original or copy of the
document shall be made a part of the file before attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule.
(81 No affidavit for attorneys' fees need be filed in
order to receive an award of attorneys' fees pursuant
to this rule.
(Added effective March 31, 1992.'
Rule 4-506. Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for
withdrawal of counsel in civil cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of record except guardians ad
litem and court-appointed counsel.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may withdraw as counsel of record
without the approval of the court except when la) a
motion has been filed and is pending before the court
or (b) a certificate of readiness for trial has been filed.
Under these circumstances, an attorney may not
withdraw except upon motion and order of the court.
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of
record, written notice of the withdrawal must be
served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney
and upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed with the court. If a trial
date has been set. the notice of withdrawal served
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial
date.
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from the case or ceases to act as
an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in writing,
the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to
retain another attorney or appear in person before
opposing counsel can initiate further proceedings
against the client. A copy of the writ-en notice shall
be filed with the court and no furtner proceedings
shall be held in the matter until 20 days have elapsed
from the date of filing.
(Amended effective Januarv 15. 1990: April 15,
1991.)
Rule 4-507. Disposition of funds on trustee's
sale.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing trustee
affidavits of deposit and claimant petitions for adjudication of priority in trustee's sales.
To establish a uniform procedure in determining
the disposition of funds on trustee's sales.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of depositing with the Clerk of the
Court any proceeds from a trustee's sale in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Section 57-1-29, the
trustee shall file an affidavit with the clerk setting
forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known
claimants, including known addresses. The clerk
shall notify the listed claimants within 10 days of
receiving the affidavit of deposit.
(2) Any claimant may then file a petition for adjudication of priority to these funds and request a hearing before the court. The petitioner requesting the
hearing shall give notice of the hearing to all claimants listed in the trustee's affidavit of deposit and any
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others known to the petitioner. All persons having or
claiming an interest must appear and assert their
claim or be barred thereafter.
(3) Pursuant to the determination hearing, the
court will establish the priorities of the parties to the
trustee's sale proceeds and enter an order with the
clerk of the court or county treasurer directing the
disbursement of funds as determined.
Rule 4-508. Unpublished opinions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of
unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not
of record.
Statement of the Rule:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have
no precedential value and shall not be cited or used in
the courts of this state, except for purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or
collateral estoppel.
(Added effective January 15, 1990.)
ARTICLE 6.
CRIMINAL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-601. Victims and witnesses.
IntentTo establish procedures which ensure that victims
and witnesses of crime are treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity.
To establish procedures which ensure that child
victims and child witnesses of crime are treated with
consideration for their age and maturity and in a
manner that is the least traumatic, intrusive or intimidating.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the judiciary, prosecutors,
defense counsel, and law enforcement and corrections
personnel in all felony cases in and all misdemeanor
cases where personal injury is sustained by the victim. This rule also applies to all individuals who have
been subpoenaed or called to testify as witnesses in
any criminal proceeding.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prosecuting agency shall provide written verification to
the court that all victims and subpoenaed witnesses
have been informed of their responsibilities during
the criminal proceedings and that those proceedings
have been explained to them in a manner which is
understandable, given the age and maturity of the
victims and witnesses.
(2) At the time of the arraignment or preliminary
hearing, or as soon thereafter as possible, the prosecuting agency shall provide written verification to
the court that all victims and subpoenaed witnesses
have been informed of their right to be free from
threats, intimidation and harm by anyone seeking to
induce the victim or witness to testify falsely, withhold testimony or information, avoid legal process, or
secure the dismissal of or prevent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment or information. At that
time and where facilities are available, the prosecuting agency shall provide written verification to the
court that the victims and witnesses have been informed of their right to a separate waiting area.
(3) Unless otherwise waived in writing, the prosecuting agency shall provide notice to all victims of the
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transfer the case, including the record and file of
the case from the trial court, all papers filed in
the Court of Appeals, and a written statement of
all docket entries in the case up to and including
the certification order, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court The Clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of
the trial court that the case has been transferred.
(3) Upon receipt of the order of certification,
the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall enter the
appeal upon the docket of the Supreme Court
The clerk of the Supreme Court shall immediately send notices to all parties and to the clerk
of the trial court that the case has been docketed
and that all further filings will be made with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court. The notice shall
state the docket number assigned to the case in
the Supreme Court. The case shall proceed before
the Supreme Court to final decision and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to these
rules
14) If the record on appeal has not been filed
with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the
date of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals shall notify the clerk of the trial
court that upon completion of the conditions for
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall
transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court If, however, the record on appeal
has already been transmitted to and filed with
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals as of the date of
the entry of the order of transfer, the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals shall transmit the record on
appeal to the Clerk of the Supreme Court within
five days of the date of the entry of the order of
transfer,
(c) Criteria for transfer. The Court of Appeals
shall consider certification only in the following
cases
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it is
apparent that the case should be decided by the
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court
would probably grant a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case if decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how the Court of Appeals
might rule, and
(2) Cases which will govern a number of other
cases involving the same legal issue or issues
pending in the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit courts, or the Court of Appeals or which are
cases of first impression under state or federal
law which will have wide applicability.
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed
in a timely manner but is pursued in an appellate
court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the
appellate court, either on its own motion lor) on motion of any party, shall transfer the case, including
the record on appeal, all motions and other orders,
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with
appellate jurisdiction in the case. The clerk of the
transferring court shall give notice to all parties and
to the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring
the case The time for filing all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time
schedule of the receiving court.

Rule 47

TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO COURT
OF APPEALS.
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court of Appeals.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a
judgment, an order, and a decree therein referred to
as "decisions"} of the Court of Appeals shall be initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only for special and important reasons The following,
while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law,
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in a
way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by
a lower court as to call for an exercise of the
Supreme Court's power of supervision, or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by
the Supreme Court.
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of
record; filing; parties.
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the petitioner shall, within the time
provided by Rule 48, pay the certiorari docketing fee
and file ten copies of a petition which shall comply in
all respects with Rule 49 The case then will be placed
on the certiorari docket Counsel for the petitioner
shall serve four copies of the petition on counsel for
each party separately represented. It shall be the
duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties
in the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari
docket number of the case. Service and notice shall be
given as required by Rule 21.
(bi Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or otherwise in a decision
may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one
or more of them may petition separately; or any two
or more of them may join in a petition. When two or
more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari
and involve identical or closely related questions, it
will suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases.
(c) Cross-petition of respondent. Counsel for a
respondent wishing to file a cross-petition shall,
within the time provided by Rule 48(d), pay the certiorari docketing fee and file ten copies of a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari which shall comply in all
respects with Rule 49. The cross-petition will then be
placed on the certiorari docket Counsel for the crosspetitioner shall serve four copies of the cross-petition
on counsel for each party separately represented. It
shall be the duty of counsel for the cross-petitioner to
notify all parties in the case of the date of the filing
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and of the certiorari docket number of the case Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21
A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari may not be
joined with any other filing, the clerk shall not accept
any filing so joined
(d) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the
Court of Appeals shall be deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's
belief that one or more of the parties below have no
interest in the outcome of the petition A copy of such
notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding
below, and a party noted as no longer interested may
remain a party by notifying the clerk, with »ervice on
the other parties, that the party has an interest in the
petition
le) Motion for certification and transmission of
record. A party intending to file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to
action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file
a motion for an order to have the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals or the clerk of the trial court certify the
record, or any part of it. and provide for its transmission to the Supreme Court Motions to certify the
record prior to action on the petition b\ the Supreme
Court should rarely be made, only when the record is
essential to the Supreme Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such
understanding cannot be derived from the contents of
the petition or the brief in opposition, including the
appendix If a motion is appropriate, it shall be made
to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but
prior to action by the Supreme Court on the petition
In the case of a stay of execution of a judgment of the
Court of Appeals, such a motion may be made before
the filing of the petition Thereafter, the Clerk of the
Supreme Court or am party to the case may request
that additional parts of the record be certified and
transmitted to the Supreme Court Copies of all motions for certification and transmission shall be sent
to the parties to the proceeding All motions and orders shall comply with and be subject to the requirements of Rule 23.
Rule 48. Time for petitioning.
(ai Timeliness of petition. A petition for a writ of
certiorari must be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court within 30 days after the entry of the decision
by the Court of Appeals
(b) Refusal of petition. The clerk will refuse to
receive any petition for a writ of certiorari which is
jurisdictionallv out of time
(ci Effect of petition for rehearing. The time for
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the
date the decision is entered by the Court of Appeals,
not from the date of the issuance of the remittitur. If.
however, a petition for rehearing is timely filed by
any party, the time for filing the petition for a writ of
certiorari for all parties runs from the date of the
denial of rehearing or of the entry of a subsequent
decision entered upon the rehearing
ld> Time for cross-petition.
(1) A cross-petition for a writ of certiorari
must be filed
(A) within the time provided in subdivisions (a/ and (c> of this rule, or
(B) within 30 days of the filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari
(2) Any cross-petition timely only pursuant to
paragraph (d)(1)(B) of this rule will not be
granted unless a timely petition for a writ of certiorari of another party to the case is granted.
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lei Extension of time. The Supreme Court, upon a
showing of excusable neglect or good cause. ma\ extend the time for filing a petition or a cross-petition
for a writ of certiorari upon motion filed not later
than 30 davs after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph iai or (c> of this rule, whichever
is applicable Any such motion which is filed before
expiration of the prescribed time maj be ex parte
unless the Supreme Court otherwise requires Notice
of any such motion which is filed after expiration of
the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the
order granting the motion, whichever occurs later
Rule 49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
(a i Contents. The petition for a writ of certiorari
shall contain, in the order indicated
(DA list of all parties to the proceeding in the
court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed,
except where the caption of the case in the Supreme Court contains the names of all parties.
(2) A table of contents with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabeticallv arranged and with parallel citations,
agency rules, court rules, statutes, and authorities cued, with references to the pages of the petition where they are cited
(4) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the
case but without unnecessary detail The statement of the questions should be short and concise
and should not be argumentative or repetitious
General conclusions, such as "the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not supported b> the law or
facts." are not acceptable The statement of a
question presented will be deemed to comprise
every subsidiary question fairly included therein
Only the questions set forth in the petition or
fairly included therein will be considered by the
Supreme Court
(5) A reference to the official and unofficial reports of any opinions issued by the Court of Appeals.
(6) A concise statement of the grounds on
which the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
invoked, showing
(A) the date of the entry of the decision
sought to be reviewed.
iBi the date of the entry of any order respecting a rehearing and the date of the
entry and terms of any order granting an
extension of time within which to petition for
certiorari;
(C) reliance upon Rule 47(c). where a
cross-petition for a writ of certiorari is filed,
stating the filing date of the petition for a
writ of certiorari in connection with which
the cross-petition is filed, and
(Di the statutory provision believed to
confer on the Supreme Court jurisdiction to
review the decision in question by a writ of
certiorari.
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions,
statutes, ordinances, and regulations that the
case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving the appropriate citation If the controlling
provisions involved are lengthy, their citation
alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent
text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to
in subparagraph (10) of this paragraph.
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<8i A statement of the case. The statement
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of the proceedings, and its disposition
in the lower courts There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented
for review All statements of fact and references
to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record and to the opinion of the
Court of Appeals
(9) With respect to each question presented, a
direct and concise argument exp'ainmg the special and important reasons as provided in Rule
46 for the issuance of the writ.
(10) An appendix containing, in the following
order.
t A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, and all orders including any order on rehearing, delivered by the Court of Appeals in rendering
the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B) copies of any other opinions, findings
of fact, conclusions of law, orders, judgments,
or decrees that were rendered in the case or
in companion cases by the Court of Appeals
and by other courts or by administrative
agencies and that are relevant to the questions presented Each document shall include the caption showing the name of the
issuing court or agency, the title and number
of the case, and the date of its entry; and
(C) any other judicial or administrative
opinions or orders that are relevant to the
questions presented but were not entered in
the case that is the subject of the petition
If the material that is required by subparagraphs
(7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such
may, if more convenient, be separately presented
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of
certiorari shall comply with the form of a bnef as
specified in Rule 27 The cover of the petition shall be
white The clerk shall examine all petitions before
filing, and if a petition is not prepared in accordance
with Rule 27 and this paragraph, it will not be filed,
but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support
of a petition for a writ of certiorari shall be set forth
in the body of the petition, as provided in subparagraph (aK9) of this rule. No separate bnef in support
of a petition for a writ of certiorari will be received,
and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a writ
of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any
supporting brief
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by
subparagraph (a)(7) of this rule, and the appendix.
(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity.
The failure of a petitioner to present with accuracy,
brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate understanding of the points requiring
consideration will be a sufficient reason for denying
the petition.
Rule 50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of
amicus curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall
have 30 days after service of a petition in which to file
ten copies of an opposing bnef, disclosing any matter
or ground why the case should not be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Such brief shall comply with the requirements of Rule 49, as applicable, and comply
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with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27 The
cover of the brief shall be orange. The clerk snail
examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not
prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and with the
proper cover it will not be filed, but shall be returned
to be properly prepared Four copies of the brief snail
be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each
party separately represented
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be
as short as possible and may not. ,n any single cat-e.
exceed 20 pages, excluding the subiect index, the fable of authorities, anv verbatim auotations required
by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a petition for a writ of certiorari
will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction ot the
Supreme Court to grant the writ of certiorari may be
included in the brief in opposition
id) Distribution of filings. Upon the film? ot a
brief in opposition, the expiration ot the time allowed
therefor, or express waiver of the nght to file, the
petition and the brief, if anv. will be disuibuted bv
the clerk for consideration However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed, distribution
of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will
be delaved until the filing of a brief in opposition bv
the cross-respondent, the expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the brief in opposition mav be
filed by any petitioner, but distribution under paragraph (dl of this rule wiil not be delayed pending the
filing of any such brief. Such brief snail be as short as
possible, but may not exceed five pages Such brief
shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in
Rule 27 The cover of the brief shall be yellow The
clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a
brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27 and
with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but snail be
returned to be properly prepared Ten copies of the
brief shall be filed, and four copies snail be served as
prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately represented.
(f) Bnef of amicus curiae. A bnef of an amicus
curiae may be filed only if accompanied by written
consent of all parties, by leave of the Supreme Court
granted on motion, or at the request of the Supreme
Court. A motion for leave shall identify the interest of
the applicant and shall state the reasons whv a briet
of an amicus cunae is desirable Except as all parties
otherwise consent, an amicus curiae shall file its brief
within the time allowed the party whose position it
will support, unless the Supreme Court for cause
shown shall grant leave for later filing, in which
event it shall specify within what period an opposing
party may answer. Such brief shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 49. as applicable, and comply
with the form of briefs as specified in Rule 27 The
cover of the brief shall be green. The orief mav not
exceed 20 pages, excluding the subiect index, the table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required
by Rule 49(a)(7), and the appendix Ten copies of the
brief shall be filed, and four copiei shall be served as
prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately represented.
Rule 51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
(a) Order after consideration. After consideration of the documents distributed pursuant to Rule
50, the Supreme Court will enter an order denying
the petition or granting the petition in whole or in
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part. The order shall be decided summarily, shall be
without oral argument, and shall not constitute a decision on the merits.
(bl Grant of petition. Whenever an order granting a petition for a writ of certiorari is entered, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith shall notify the
Clerk of the Court of Appeals and counsel of record.
The case then will stand for briefing and oral argument. If the record has not previously been filed, the
Clerk of the Supreme Court shall request the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals to certify it and transmit it to
the Supreme Court. A formal writ shall not issue unless specially directed.
(c) Denial of petition. Whenever a petition for a
writ of certiorari is denied, an order to that effect will
be entered, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court forthwith will notify the Court of Appeals and counsel of
record.

Reference.?
Utah R. App P. 3(a); 3(c); 3id); 3(f); 4: 40(a)
Form 2. Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
Attorney Name
Address
Phone Number
Bar Number
IN THE UTAH [SUPREME COURT] [COURT OF
APPEALS]
A.B.,
Plaintiff and
[Petitioner]
[Respondent]

FORMS
FORM

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Notice of Appeal.
Petition for Interlocutory Appeal.
Affidavit of Impecuniosity.
Request for Transcript.
Acknowledgment of Receipt of Request for Transcript; Motion for Enlargement of Time.
6. Certificate That No Transcript is Required.
7. Docketing Statement.
8. Checklist for Briefs — Rules 24, 26, and 27.
9. Checklist for Petitions for Certiorari — Rules 45
through 51.
10. Certificate of Service [9].
11. Petition for Writ of Review.
Explanatory Notes for Appellate Forms
Form 1. Notice of Appeal
Attorney Name
Address
Phone Number
Bar Number
IN THE [TRIAL COURT]
OF THE [NUMBER] JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

)

) NOTICE OF
APPEAL [1]
Plaintiff and
t
[Appellant] [Appellee] i Trial Court No.
vs.
)
A.B.,

CD.,
Defendant and
)
[Appellee] [Appellant] >
(1) Notice is hereby given that [plaintiff] [defendant] and appellant.
(name)
[through counsel.
(name'
,] appeals
to the Utah [Supreme Court] [Court of Appeals] the
final [judgment] [order] of the Honorable
(name)
entered
in
this
matter
on
(date)
.
(2a) The appeal is taken from the entire judgment.
[OR]
(2b i The appeal is taken from such part of the judgment that states that
(signature)
Attorney of Record [2]
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PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

vs.
CD.,
Trial Court No.
Defendant and
[Respondent]
[Petitioner]
(1)
(Name)
through counsel,
petitions the Utah [Su(name)
preme Court] [Court of Appeals] to permit an appeal
from the interlocutory order of the Honorable
(name1
entered in this matter on
(date)
(2) A copy of the order sought to be reviewed land
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and opinion of the
trial court] [is] [are] attached.
(31 STATEMENT OF FACTS: (Provide a statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of
the question(s) of law determined by the order sought
to be reviewed.)
(41 QUESTIONS OF LAW: (Provide a statement of
the question(s) of law determined by the order sought
to be reviewed.)
(5) ISSUE RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: (Provide a
demonstration that each question was properly presented to the trial court judge.)
(6' IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: (Provide
a statement of the reasons why an immediate appeal
of the question(s) of law should be permitted.)
(7) ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION:
(provide a statement of the reasons why the appeal
will materially advance the termination of the litigation, i
(signature)
Attorney of Record [2]
References
Utah R. App. P. 3(c); 3(d); 5(a): 5(c); 40(a)
Form 3. Affidavit of Impecuniosity
Individual Name
Address
Phone Number
, do solemnly [swear] [affirm]
I,.
(name)
that owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the
expenses of the appeal which I am about to take and
that I believe I am entitled to the relief sought by
such appeal.
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other
papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise
provided in these rules, every order required by its
terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the
original complaint unless the court otherwise orders
because of numerous defendants, even' paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a party
unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
everj' written notice, appearance, demand, offer of
judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58Aid), and similar paper shall be served
upon each of the parties. No service need be made on
parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule 55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims for relief
against them which shall be served upon them in the
manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether
through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar
process, in which no person need be or is named as
defendant, any service required to be made prior to
the filing of an answer, claim or appearance shall be
made upon the person having custody or possession of
the property at the time of its seizure.
(bi Service: How made.
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(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of
pleadings and other papers with the court as required
by these rules shall be made by filing them with the
clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit
the papers to be filed with him, in which event he
shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 6. Time.
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local
rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default
from which the designated period of time begins to
run shall not be included. The last day of the period
so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday,
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the
period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its
discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion
made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b).
59(b), Id) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g). except to the
extent and under the conditions stated in them.
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period
of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking
of any proceeding is not affected or limited by the
continued existence or expiration of a term of court.
The continued existence or expiration of a term of
court in no way affects the power of a court to do any
act or take any proceeding in any civil action which
has been pending before it.
(d) For motions — Affidavits. A written motion,
other than one which may be heard ex parte, and
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not later
than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing,
unless a different period is fixed by these rules or by
order of the court. Such an order may for cause shown
be made on ex parte application. When a motion is
supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall be served
with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not
later than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court
permits them to be served at some other time.
<e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some
act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon
him and the notice or paper is served upon him by
mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period.

! 11 Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court. Service upon the
attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his
known address or, if no address is known, by
leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of
a copy within this rule means: Handing it to the
attorney or to the party; or leaving it at his office
with his clerk or other person in charge thereof;
or. if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a
conspicuous place therein; or, if the office is
closed or the person to be served has no office,
leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of
abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is
complete upon mailing.
(2i A resident attorney, on whom pleadings
and other papers may be served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney practicing in any of the courts of this state.
ic i Service: Numerous defendants. In any action
in which there are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own initiative,
may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any cross-claim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to
be denied or avoided by all other parties and that the
filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon
the plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties.
A copy of every such order shall be served upon the
parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
td) Filing. All papers after the complaint required
to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court
PART III.
either before service or within a reasonable time
thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS.
or on its own initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an
filed unless on order of the court or for use in the
answer; a reply to a counterclaim denominated as
nrnrppHinp.
such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer con-
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the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Rule 52. Findings by the court.
la) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings
on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted
under Rules 12(b). 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the
motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court
may amend its findings or make additional findings
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the
party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a
motion for a new trial.
Ic) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties
to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the
trial:
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in
the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1. 1987.)
Rule 53. Masters.
(a) Appointment and compensation. Any or all
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accordance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the
parlies or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the
action, which is in the custody and control of the
court as the court may direct. The master shall not
retain his report as security for his compensation; but
when the party ordered to pay the compensation allowed by the court does not pay it after notice and
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is
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entitled tc. a writ of execution against the delinquent
party.
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues
are complicated: in actions to be tried without a jury.
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition
requires it.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only
and may fix the time and place for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may require
the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, including the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by
the order of reference and has the authority to put
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them
and may call the parties to the action and examine
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence
for a court sitting without a jury.
(d) Proceedings.
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time
and place for the first meeting of the parties or
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after
the date of the order of reference and shall notify
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence.
Either party, on notice to the parties and master,
may apply to the court for an order requiring the
master to speed the proceedings and to make his
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a
future day, giving notice to the absent party of
the adjournment.
(21 Witnesses. The parties may procure the
attendance of witnesses before the master by the
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be punished as for a contempt and be subjected to the
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided
in Rules 37 and 45.
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of
accounting are in issue before the master, he
may prescribe the form in which the accounts
shall be submitted and in any proper case mayrequire or receive in evidence a statement by a
certified public accountant who is called as a witness. Upon objection of a party to any of the
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the
form of statement is insufficient, the master may
require a different form of statement to be fur-
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nished. or the accounts or specific items thereof
to be proved by oral examination of the accounting parties or upon written interrogatories or in
such other manner as he directs.
ie) Report.
(1) Contents and filing. The master shall
prepare a report upon the matters submitted to
him by the order of reference and. if required to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, he
shall set them forth in the report. He shall file
the report with the clerk of the court and in an
action to be tried without a jury, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, shall file
with it a transcript of the proceedings and of the
evidence and the original exhibits. The clerk
shall forthwith mail to all parties notice of the
filing.
(2) In non-jury actions. In an action to be
tried without a jury the court shall accept the
master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.
Within 10 days after being served with notice of
the filing of the report any party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties. Application to the court for action upon the report
and upon objections thereto shall be by motion
and upon notice as prescribed in Rule 6<d). The
court after hearing may adopt the report or may
modify it or may reject it in whole or in part or
mav receive further evidence or may recommit it
with instructions.
(3) In jury actions. In an action to be tried by
a jury' the master shall not be directed to report
the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as evidence of the
matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court upon any objections
in point of law which may be made to the report.
(4i Stipulation as to findings. The effect of a
master's report is the same whether or not the
parties have consented to the reference; but.
when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law
arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
(5) Draft report. Before filing his report a
master may submit a draft thereof to counsel for
all parties for the purpose of receiving their suggestions.
(fi Objections to appointment of master. A
party may object to the appointment of any person as
a master on the same grounds as a party may challenge for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial
of a civil action. Such objections must be heard and
disposed of by the court in the same manner as a
motion.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
PART VII.
JUDGMENT.
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(ai Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these
rules includes a decree and any order from which an
appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of
prior proceedings.
(bi Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one
claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and or when multiple parties are involved, the
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court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties
only upon an express determination by the court that
there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of
such determination and direction, any order or other
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and
the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
to Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against
whom a judgment is entered by default, evenfinal judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one
or more of several claimants: and it may, when
the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in
the demand for judgment.
id) Costs.
11 > To whom awarded. Except when express
provision therefor is made either in a statute of
this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed
as of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs;, provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the
cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers
and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent
permitted by law.
I2I How assessed. The party who claims his
costs must within five days after the entry of
judgment serve upon the adverse party against
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court
a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating
that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party
dissatisfied with the costs claimed may. within
seven days after service of the memorandum of
costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed
by the court in which the judgment was rendered.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after
the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the
service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law. but before the entry of judgment,
shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date judgment is entered.
(31, i4i [Deleted. 1
(et Interest and costs to be included in the
judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment
signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the
same have been taxed or ascertained. The clerk must,
within two days after the costs have been taxed or
ascertained, in any case where not included in the
judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in
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the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions ana in the
judgment docket
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 )
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk
shall enter his default
(2) Notice to party in default. After the
entry of the default of any partv. as provided in
Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding,
except as provided in Rule 5(al. in Rule 58A(di or
in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of
damages of the nondefaulting party
(b) Judgment. Judgment b> default may be entered as follow ,
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a
sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personal!} served
otherwise than bv publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the
amount due and costs against the defendant, if
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if
he is not an infant or incompetent person
(2) By the court. In all other cases tne party
entitled to a judgment by default shall apph to
the court therefor If, in order to enable the court
to enter )udgment or to cam' it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the
amount of damages or to establish the truth of
any averment b\ evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter the court mav conduct such hearings or order such references as it
deems necessary and proper
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a
judgment by default has been entered may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)
(d> Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the
parn entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a partv who has pleaded
a cross-claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54lcl
(el Judgment against the state or officer or
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court
(Amended effective Sept 4. 1985 )
Rule 56. Summary judgment.
lai For claimant. A parn seeking to recover upon
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declarator}.-judgment ma;. at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or cros«-claim is asserted or a
declaratory judgment is soujrht. mav, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summan' judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof
ic) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment,
interlocutory in cnaracter, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine
issue as to the amount of damages
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on
motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by
examining the pleadings and the evidence before it
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make
an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the
trial shall be conducted accordingly
(e) Form of affidavits: further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule an adverse partv mav not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
thi» rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him
(fi When affidavits are unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a partv opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just
igi Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the partv employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and am offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilt} of contempt
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court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against
(4) Newl\ discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application which he could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced at the trial
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law
(7) Error in law
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported bv affidavit
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion The opposing party has 10 days after such sen-ice within
which to serve opposing affidavits The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation The
court may permit reply affidavits
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
ma\ order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new'tnal on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any. as the court orders During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court
(bi Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect;
newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b), (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party, (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required byRule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action, (5) the judgment is void, (6) the judgment
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application, or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made
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within a reasonable time and for reasons (li, (2), (3).
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a partv from a judgment order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court The procedure for obtaining anv relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action
Rule 61. Harmless error.
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice The court at every
stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties
Rule 62. Stay of proceedings to enforce a judgment.
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment. Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs
(b) Stay on motion for new trial or for judgment. In its discretion ana on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made
pursuant to Rule 59. or of a motion for relief from a
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60. or of a
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50. or of a
motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b)
(c) Injunction pending appeal. When an appeal
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
court in its discretion mav suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for
the security of the rights of the adverse party
(d) Stay upon appeal. When an appeal is taken
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond mav obtain a stav. unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited
by law or these rules The bond may be given at or
after the time of filing the notice of appeal The stayis effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the court
(e) Stay in favor of the state, or agency thereof.
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the
state of Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by
direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
from the appellant
(f) Stay in quo warranto proceedings. Where
the defendant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into or unlawfully holding public office, civil or
military, within this state the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed on an appeal.
(g) Power of appellate court not limited. The
provisions in this rule do not limit any power of an
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PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review.
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants' counsel.
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990.
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment.
1. This replaces the decision in this case filed on June 17,
1992.

—

Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional
findings and conclusions should be made. On May 22, 1990,
appellants filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's May 2
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 1990, the trial
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBrv v. Fidelity
National Title Ins. Co.. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March
18, 1992) (Fidelity I). On October 21, 1991, after the briefs
were filed in Fidelity I and before it was argued, appellants
filed a motion to amend the December 11, 1990 order and
supporting memoranda. The court denied the motion, and
appellants filed this appeal.
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order. Thus,
they claim the trial court erred in denying their motion to amend
the December 11, 1990 order. Only two of the alleged procedural
irregularities were raised before the trial court-. We therefore
limit our discussion to those issues that were before the court.
First, appellants requested the trial court to delete references
to Rule 52(b) in the order of December 11, 1990 because Fidelity
sought dismissal of the appeal based on that language. Second,
appellants claimed that the order was entered in violation of
Rule 4-501(1)(d) because Fidelity did not file a "Notice to
Submit for Decision." .
In Fidelity I this court addressed the first argument and
held that the trial court did not err in disposing of the
objections as a Rule 52(b) motion. We therefore reject that
claim.
With regard to the second argument, Rule 4-501(1)(d)
provides
Upon expiration of the five-day period to
file a reply memorandum, either party may
notify the Clerk to submit the matter for
decision. The notification shall be in the
form of a separate written pleading and
captioned "Notice to Submit for Decision."
The notification shall contain a certificate
of mailing to all parties. If neither party
files a notice, the motion will not be
submitted for decision.

Rule 4-501 is an administrative rule enacted by the Utah
Judicial Council pursuant to its governance over the courts. The
rule does not rise to the level of a rule of procedure. Rather,
the mandatory language is intended to provide guidance to the
clerk's office and to put attorneys and litigants on notice in
the strongest possible terms that without affirmative action in
the form of a notice to submit, they have no right to expect
matters to come to the court's attention. Where the court,
notwithstanding the absence of a "Notice to Submit for Decision,"
perceives that a matter is ready for decision and deoides a
matter, the parties merely benefit from having the decision more
quickly than they were entitled to expect. In addition, the rule
does not contemplate objections or responses to the notice, thus
there is no prejudice if the decision is rendered without the
"Notice to Submit for Decision." Accordingly, we find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to
amend on this basis.
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline
to award attorney fee£ on appeal.
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UTAH SUPREME COURT
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,

ORDER

Plaintiffs/Petitioners,
vs.
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INS., CO.

Case No. 920269-CA

Defendant/Respondent.
Based upon motion of petitioners and stipulation of
counsel and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that petitioners may have to and
including Tuesday, September 8, 1992 to file a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari in the above case^
DATED this * j w ^day of (j(/£_

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

EXHIBIT C

Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Lynn c. McMurray, No. 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity National
Title insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Company
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

ROBERT C. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY
Plaintiff,

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. al.,
Defendants.

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Consolidated Civil No. C86-553
Plaintiff,
Judge Pat B. Brian

vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual
et al.,
Defendants.

The Motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") for Summary Judgment against Plaintiffs Robert
and Joan DeBry (collectively, "DeBrys") came on for hearing before
the above-entitled court on Wednesday, March 28, 1990, at of 1:00
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Fill

PMPV

p.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry &
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. McMurray of McMurray, McMurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly

informed in the premises, the Court now enters the

following:

FIKDIKGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

1.

Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property") .,
2.

While the Building was still under construction,

DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
3.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title & Abstract

Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing").

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number of

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

One of the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and
-2-

Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing Statement"), dated
December 13, 1985 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and made a patt hereof) . Line 48 of the Closing Statement provided
for payment cjf $79,247.16 to be made to Cascade at the Closing.
Line 44 of the Closing Statement provided for the payment of an
estimated amount of $143,092.25 to subcontractors who had worked on
the

Building

(the

"Subcontractors").

The

Closing

Statement

specifically stated:
The undersigned Buyer [DeBrys] and Seller
[Cascade] hereby approve the foregoing
statement and authorize Utah Title & Abstract
Company, to complete the transaction in
accordance herewith. All instruments may
be delivered or recorded and funds disbursed,
[emphasis added].
5.

Pursuant to DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Statement,

Utah Title disbursed the $143,092.25 to the Subcontractors, but
only $57,323.34 to Cascade because the remaining $21,923.$2 was
withheld from Cascade to pay off encumbrances on the Property
pursuant to Cascade's prior written authorization.

These amounts

were paid primarily from loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys from
Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-Woodbury").
€•

As a further part of the Closing, DeBrys also

executed a note payable to Cascade, secured by a trust deed on the
Property in the amount of $62,500.00, representing the balance of
the purchase price for the Building and Property to be paid by
-3-

DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed"). The
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written
Closing Statement at line 7.
7.

DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and

Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded.
8.

In connection with the Closing, DeBry, Cascade, and

Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Non-Merger
(DeBrys1

Agreement"

Escrow Agreement"), which was drafted by

counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Documents (a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B and made a part
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work
of constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and
although

"various

issues

concerning

the

construction

remain

unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing statement
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily
supplied by Seller."
9.

DeBrys and Cascade further agreed in DeBrys1 Escrow

Agreement that the Note and Trust Deed wo\ild be escrowed with Utah
Title as security to DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion of the
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty of workmanship and materials for
the Building; and (c) other unresolved issues.

DeBrys' Escrow

Agreement specifically provided
that the amount of increase in allowances,
the decrease in the charge of any extras, the
-4-

increase in any credits, and the amount paid
by Buyers [the DeBrys] for work which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic.1
to perform which the parties agree to or which
a court or other authority orders Buyers are
entitled to, shall be deducted from the
amount owed Seller under the Promissory Note
rthe Note! and Trust Deed. Until the disputes
which exists fsic.] concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement or otherwise,
Buyers may also deduct all funds owed it
Fsic.] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for workmanship and materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indemnification against mechanic's liens]
from the amounts owed under the Promissory
Note and Trust Deed [emphasis added].

10.

By letter dated December 16, 1985 (three days

after the date of the signed Closing Statement), 'Mr. Jeffrey K.
Woodbury ("Woodbury"), attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury
(the "Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof).

Richards-

Woodbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds on the
title" of the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment for a
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was
expressly authorized in the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions
to

use

Richards-Woodbury's

loan

encumbrances and "clouds on title."
-5-

proceeds

to

clear

those

11.

The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:
After you have determined that all the liens
and clouds on the property [the Property]
have been satisfied and removed and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[the Trust Deed on the Property securing
Richards-Woodbury's loan to Debrys] will be
a first lien, you may disburse the remaining
funds from the check described in paragraph
8. above [the $485,973.35 check representing
the total loan proceeds from Richards-Woodbury's
loan to Debrys] to Cascade Enterprises
[emphasis added].

In drafting the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions, Woodbury
did not intend by the words "clouds on the property" to refer to
Cascade's allegedly not having a contractor's license or building
permit to construct the Building. Moreoever, the Richards-Woodbury
Escrow Instructions said nothing about Cascade's having or not
having a contractor's license or building permit, and specifically
did not refer to any lack of a contractor's license or building
permit by Cascade as a "cloud" on the Property's title.
12.

DeBrys filed this action against Cascade and others

for the alleged faulty construction of the Building. DeBrys named
Utah Title as one of many defendants and asserted the following
claims against Utah Title:
a.

That

Cascade did

not have

a

license or building permit to construct the Building.

contractor's
DeBrys

claimed that this constituted a "cloud" on the title of the

Property pursuant to the Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions,
that they are beneficiaries of those escrow instructions, and that
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorized
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should not have disbursed to
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor's license and
building permit.
b.

That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse

any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
c.

That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for

allegedly negligently misrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
13.

Since the filing of this action, DeBrys have amended

their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant.

In their

Fourth Amended Complaint, which is the governing complaint in this
action, DeBrys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter of
Utah Title for the purpose of issuing title policies, and that
pursuant to §31A-23-308, Utah Code Annotated (UCA), Fidelity is
liable for Utah Title's alleged misconduct. §31A-23-308 states, in
relevant part:
Any title company represented by one or more
title insurance agents, is directly and
primarily liable to others dealing with the
title insurance agents for the receipt and
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disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
closings, or settlements with the title
insurance agents in all those transactions
where a commitment or binder for or policy
or contract of title insurance of that title
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the title insurance
company has been issued or distributed.
14.

After Fidelity was brought into this action as a

party Defendant by DeBrys, Utah Title filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
petition, which was later converted to a Chapter 7. The Chapter 7
proceeding is still pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at all times relevant an attorney

licensed to practice law in the State of Utah.

The DeBrys were

also represented by other counsel at the Closing who drafted some
of the Closing Documents, including DeBry's Escrow Agreement.
16.

Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed

after the discovery cut-off date in the above-entitled action.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Based on the foregoing undisputed material facts, the
Court hereby enters the following conclusions of law:

1.

Any lack of a contractor's license or building

permit by Cascade did not create a cloud on the title to the
Property.
-8-

2.

Neither the December 16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow Instructions nor any of the Closing Documents required Utah
Title to determine whether Cascade had a contractor's license or a
building permit.
3.

There is no ambiguity in the Closing Documents,

including without limitation in the Closing Statement or DeBrys'
Escrow Agreement.

If there were any ambiguities in DeBrys* Escrow

Agreement, they would be construed against DeBrys, who prepared the
document.
4.

The alleged ambiguity asserted by DeBrys with

respect to line 44 of the Closing Statement is easily clarified,
reconciled, and construed by reference to the Closing Documents
themselves without the need for any parol evidence.
5.

The Closing Documents authorized immediate

disbursement of the amounts due Subcontractors (line 44 of the
Closing Statement) and the balance owing to Seller (line 48 of the
Closing Statement) without further approval by DeBrys.

The oral

agreements alleged by DeBrys are inconsistent with the written
Closing .Documents, and the parol evidence rule prohibits the
introduction of any evidence of such inconsistent oral agreements.
6.

The

December

16, 1985 Richards-Woodbury

Escrow

Instructions were intended to protect someone other than DeBrys.
DeBrys are not third-party beneficiaries of the December 16, 1985
Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions and have no standing to
-9-

assert any alleged violation of those instructions.
7.

There was no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there was no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
8.

Fidelity is not liable to DeBrys under §31A-23-308,

Utah Code Annotated.

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

DeBrys in connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement
regarding the Property.
9.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a matter of law,
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against DeBrys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
Dated this

day of

, 1990.

BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
/

SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this '1^

day of April, 1990,

to:
Edward T. Wells
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first class mail, postage prepaid,
this

day of April, 1990 to:

Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
#185 So. State Street, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Cascade Construction
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Salt
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94107

Maughan
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84147

Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, #1000
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Dale Thurgood
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #600
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Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejo, California

Craig Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

94859

Stanley Postma
2571 South 75 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling
SHEARER & CARLING
200 South Main Street, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84 010

Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, BETTILYON & KESLER
2677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN & HANSEN
136 South Main, 8th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBIT D

DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co.

CODE*CO
Pravo. Utah

182 Uuii Adv Rep. 51

51

Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial
Gteas '
Administration,2 Fidelity submitted the prop182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51
osed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment to the trial court on May 2, 1990.
INTHE
That same day, the trial court signed and the
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
clerk of the court entered the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and judgment.
Robert J. DeBRY and Joan DeBry,
On May 7, 1990, five days after entry of
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
judgment, DeBrys filed a document entitled
v.
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to
FTOELTTY NATIONAL TITLE .
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
INSURANCE CO.,
Law." In the document, DeBrys objected to
Defendant and Appellee.
various findings of fact and conclusions of law
and argued that specific additional findings of
No. 910329-CA
fact and conclusions of law should be made by
FILED: March 18,1992
. . .
the trial court. On May 22, 1990, DeBrys filed
a notice of appeal "from the order ... granting
Third District, Salt Lake County . - •
summary judgment ... entered ... on May 2,
Honorable Pat B. Brian
1990." . • • • • ' •
On November 16, 1990, Fidelity mailed to
ATTORNEYS:
DeBrys'
counsel a copy of a proposed order
Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for
denying
DeBrys'
objections and additions to
Appellants
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt
law. The proposed order characterized
Lake City, for Appellee
DeBrys' objections and additions as a motion
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and
pursuant to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Russon.
Procedure.3 DeBrys did not object to the
proposed order. Thereafter, on December 11,
1990, the trial court signed the order expressly
This opinion is subject to revision before
construing DeBrys' objections and additions
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
as a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule
GARFF, Judge:
52(b). The court's order, a copy of which had
This is an appeal from a summary judgment been previously mailed to DeBrys' counsel on
dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs, Robert November 16, 1990, stated, "IT IS HEREBY
J. DeBry and Joan DeBry (DeBrys), against ORDERED that Plaintiffs''motion pursuant
defendant Fidelity National -Title Insurance to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Company (Fidelity). The summary judgment to amend the proposed Findings of Fact and
was certified by the trial court for appeal Conclusions of Law be and is hereby denied."
pursuant.to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil DeBrys did not file a notice of appeal after the
Procedure. The underlying action,'which inv- court's December 11,"' 1990, order, nor did
olves multiple parties and multiple causes of they object to the order until some ten months
action,1 stems from DeBrys' purchase of an later on October 21, 1991, when they filed a
office building. As a threshold matter, Fidelity motion to amend pursuant to Rule 60, Utah
claims that notice of appeal was not timely Rules of Civil Procedure. After oral argument,
4
filed/ and therefore,' this • appeal should be the trial court denied the motion to amend. '-' *
DeBrys argue that their document concerdismissed. Because timely notice of appeal is
jurisdictional, Armstrong Rubber Co. v. ning objections and additions to proposed
Bastian, 657 P.2d ,1346, 1348 (Utah 1983); findings of fact and conclusions of law was
Nelson v." Stoker, 669 P.2d 390, 392 (Utah not a Rule 52(b) motion and that the trial
1983), we must first determine whether court erred in construing it as such.5 In deteDeBrys' notice of appeal was timely.
-n ., rmining whether the court properly characteOn March 28, 1990, after DeBrys and Fid- rized DeBrys' document, we look to the docelity presented oral argument, the trial court ument's substance rather than its caption. See
granted Fidelity's motion for summary judg- Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1347-48 (citing Howard
ment. The court directed Fidelity to prepare v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 152,~356
and submit to the court proposed findings of P.2d 275, 276 (I960)); Callardo v. Bolinder,
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990) (per curiam).
conformity with the court's ruling. Utah R. The court's conclusion that DeBrys'' document constituted a Rule 52(b) motion- is legal
Civ. P. 52(a).
On April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered in nature; thus, it is accorded no particular
to DeBrys' counsel a copy of the proposed deference ' and reviewed for correctness.
findings of facr, conclusions of law, and jud- Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson,- 782 P.2d
gment. All other counsel were served by mail 467, 470 (Utah 1989); City of W. Jordan v.
on April 25, 1990. After allowing the five- Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 532~(Utah
day objections period to run, as specified in 1988); but see Valenzuela v. Mercy Hosp., 521
-

•

^
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•

*

*
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P.2d.l287. 1288-89 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974)
(reviewing for "abuse of- discretion" trial
court's construction of motion to vacate as
motion to amend under Rule 59(e)).
DeBrys insist that their document concerning objections and additions to findings of
fact and conclusions of law should not have
been construed as a Rule 52(b) motion because
it did not constitute a "motion" per se.« They
reason that because their document was an
objection and not a post-judgment motion,
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) does
not apply, and that their notice of appeal was
valid and that hence this court has jurisdiction
to hear the appeal.7
Regardless of how it is captioned, a motion
filed within ten days of the entry of judgment
that questions the correctness of the court's
findings and conclusions is properly treated as
a post-judgment motion under either Rules
52(b) or 59(e).» Armstrong. 657 P.2d at 134748; Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817; Vreeken v.
Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 345 (10th Cir. 1983). The
substance of a motion, not its caption, is
controlling.' See Armstrong, 657 P.2d at 1348;
Gallardo, 800 P.2d at 817. In the instant case,
DeBrys' motion in substance requested the
trial court to amend and make additional
findings of fact and conclusions of law, a
request .recognized by Rule 52(b). Furthermore, DeBrys' motion was timely inasmuch as
it was filed five days after entry of judgment."
- Based on the circumstances and the substance of DeBrys' motion, the trial court did
not err in disposing of it as a post-judgment
motion pursuant to Rule 52(b).»
Moreover, because the trial court, under
Rules 50(b), 52(b). or 59, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, can still alter or amend the judgment, amend its findings, or make additional
findings, a notice of appeal is of no effect if
filed prior to the disposition of a postjudgment motion under any of these rules. "A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of
a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective
to confer jurisdiction upon this court." Transamcrica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723
P.2d 425, 426 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); accord
Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d
1043, 1044 (Utah 1984); U-M Invs. v. Ray,
658 P.2d 1186, .1186-87 (Utah 1982) (per
curiam). Once a timely post-judgment
motion is made pursuant to one of these rules,
to permit an appeal would be an affront to
judicial' economy inasmuch as the very
purpose of such a motion is to allow a trial
court to correct its own errors, thus avoiding
needless appeals. Cf. U-M Invs., 658 P.2d at
1187 (recognizing that the requirement of
filing a notice of appeal after disposition of a
post-judgment motion "may assist in discouraging delay in the judicial process*); 9
James W. Moore « a/., Moore's Federal
Practice 204.12[1], at 4-68, 4-69 & n.5 (2d

ed. 1991) (stating that "[t]he very purpose of
such [post-judgment] motions is to permit
the trial court to correct its own errors, and
thus avoid needless appeals").
In the instant case, summary judgment was
entered on May 2, 1990. DeBrys filed their
Rule 52(b) motion on May 7, 1990, and their
notice of appeal on May 22, 1990. The trial
court denied DeBrys' Rule 52(b) motion on
December 11, 1990. No further appeal was
filed. As previously noted, Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires the filing of
a new notice of appeal within the prescribed
time after entry of the trial court's order disposing of a Rule 52(b) post-judgment
motion. Because DeBrys failed to file a notice
of appeal after the court denied their postjudgment motion, we are without jurisdiction
and the appeal is dismissed.
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

•

1. Appeals involving other parties in this action are
now before this court.
2. Rule 4-504(2) provides that *[c]opies of the
proposed findings, judgments, and orders shall be
served upon opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submined to the court and' counsel within five days
after service.*
. . . .
3. Rule 52(b) provides in relevant part that '[ujpon
motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings
or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly.'
4. The trial court's denial of the motion to amend is
the subject of a separate notice of appeal filed on
January 28,1992.
5. In addition, DeBrys contend that the court erred
by prematurely signing the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment before the time for
objections had run pursuant to Rule 4-504(2),
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. DeBrys'
counsel was served with a copy of the proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment
on April 24, 1990, and all other counsel were served
by mail on April 25, 1990. This service by mail, they
claim, addedi three days to their five-day objections
period of Rule 4-504(2), and therefore, all counsel
had until May 7, 1990, to file their objections. Utah
R. Civ. P. 6(a) and (e).
DeBrys* argument is without merit. They were
served with a copy of the proposed findings of fan,
conclusions of law, and judgment on April 24, 1990.
Pursuant to the five-day objections period of Rule
4-504(2), excluding the intermediate Saturday and
Sunday as required by Rule 6(a), DeBrys' objections
were due May 1, 1990. On May 2, 1990, the trial
court signed and the clerk of the court entered the
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.
Although the five-day objections period for
other counsel bad not yet run, inasmuch »s they
were served by mail on April 25, 1990, the court's
apparent oversight is inconsequential for two
reasons. First, no other names had an interest in
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nor did they oppose Fidelity's motion for summary
judgment. Second, no objections were filed by other
counsel, nor have other counsel complained that
they should have been allowed to file objections.
6. A motion is an application made to the court for
the purpose of obtaining a ruling or order directing
some act to be done in favor of the applicant. Elliot
v. Elliot, 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (T«. Ct. App. 1990).
7. Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial
court by any party ... under Rule 52(b)
to amend or make additional findings of
fact, whether or not an alteration of the
judgment would be required if the
motion is granted
the time for appeal
for all parties shall run from the entry ~
.. _.of the order denying ... such motion. A
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the above motions shall
have no effect. A new notice of appeal
must be filed within the prescribed time
measured from the entry of the order of
the trial court disposing of the motion
as provided above.
8. Rule 59(e) provides that *[a] motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than
10 days after entry of the judgment. * ..
9. This is consistent with the requirement that the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure be liberally construed. Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a).
10. Additional reasons support the trial court's
construction of DeBrys' motion as a Rule 52(b) postjudgment motion. After filing their motion, DeBrys
made no attempt to withdraw the motion, nor did
they attempt to communicate to the trial court that
it was not a post-judgment motion. Despite their
knowledge that judgment had been entered five days
prior to the filing of their motion, DeBrys proceeded to file a notice of appeal. Moreover, by receiving a copy of the proposed order almost a month
before the trial conn's order disposing of their
motion, DeBrys were on notice that the court would
construe their motion as a Rule 52(b) postjudgment motion.
11. The instant case is readily distinguishable from
/Veerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah
1991), where the Utah Supreme Court held that
motions for entry of findings, pursuant to Rule
52(a) or (b), filed after a trial court's granting of
summary judgment without findings of fact, does
not toll the time for appeal. Id. at 321-23. In
contrast, the trial court in the case at bar sua sponte
requested and signed findings of faa and conclusions of law after granting Fidelity's motion for
summary judgment. Moreover, DeBrys' postjudgment motion, in contrast with that filed in /Veerings, did not request - an - entry of findings;
rather it requested the trial court to amend and
make additional findings of faa and conclusions of
law.
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U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
Myrne M. COLLIER, as personal
representative of the Estate of James A.
Collier,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
••

Kerry M. HEINZ and Southwest Virginia
Shopping Center Associates, a Utah limited
partnership,
. Defendants and Appellant.
No. 900138-CA
FILED: March 19, 1992
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup
ATTORNEYS:
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
Randy S. Feil, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Onne.
This opinion is subject to revision before publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant Heinz appeals the trial court's
judgment interpreting a settlement agreement
in favor of plaintiff, the personal representative of the Estate of James A. Collier. Heinz
also appeals the trial court's award of attorney, fees to the. estate. .We affirm the trial
court's interpretation of the'settlement agreement and reverse the award of attorney fees.
'
FACTS
Defendant Heinz and James Collier were
business partners in a number of general and
limited partnerships. Upon Collier's death,
Heinz and some of these partnerships brought
claims against Collier's estate relating to the
partnership agreements. Similarly, the estate
filed claims against Heinz and many of the
partnerships/'
--'•'-"•- -*'
On February 12, 1988, after months of
negotiations, the estate-and Heinz, both rep*
resented by counsel, entered into a settlement
agreement. In this agreement, Heinz gave up
certain rights and claims against the estate in
consideration for the estate's release of some
of its rights and claims against Heinz. Subsequent to this agreement, a dispute arose over
the rights of Heinz and the estate concerning
the distribution of assets from one of their
dissolved partnerships. Under the settlement
agreement,' the estate maintained a fifty
percent general partnership interest in that
partnership. The trial court held that the Ian-
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
TeleDhone: (301) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
(ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED)
vs.

t

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

1

Civil No. C86-553
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 60, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, plaintiff moves the court for an order amending
the court's order denying Plaintiff's Objections

to Proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which order was signed
December 11, 1990.
Plaintiff

seeks

amendment

of

the

order

to

delete

references to a Rule 52(b) motion because no such motion was ever

filed.

The order should reflect only that objections to the

"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" were denied and
that

the

court

entered

the

proposed

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law as submitted by counsel for defendant Fidelity.
Plaintiff requests oral argument pursuant to Rule 4501(3)(b) and 4-501(4).
DATED this /~\/

day of September, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER CORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED) r (DeBry V. Cascade,

et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the jj r^day of September,
1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-880/jn
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO AMEND ORDER

vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

t

Civil No. C86-553
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
Pursuant

to Rule

4-501(1)(a), plaintiffs

file this

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Order.
BACKGROUND
On March 28, 1990 the court heard and granted the motion
of

Fidelity

National

Title

Insurance

Company

(hereinafter

"Fidelity") for summary judgment. Following this hearing, counsel
for Fidelity submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law to the court along with a proposed judgment.

Prior to becoming aware that the court had signed and
entered the proposed findings and conclusions plaintiffs' counsel
filed plaintiffs' objections and additions to proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration.

See, Affidavit of Edward T. Wells,

attached as Exhibit A.
Upon receiving notice the court had signed the findings
and judgment, plaintiffs' counsel assumed the objections were
overruled by the court and notice of appeal was then timely filed.
Counsel

for

Fidelity

never

filed

a

response

to plaintiffs'

objections.
On November

16, 1990, counsel for Fidelity filed a

document entitled order denying plaintiffs' objections and motion
to amend proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

This

document was signed by the court December 11, 1990. The said order
provides:
Plaintiff's motion pursuant to Rule 52(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law be and hereby is denied.
Defendant Fidelity now seeks dismissal of plaintiffs'
appeal at the court of appeals on the ground the notice of appeal
was not filed after denial of a Rule 52 (b) motion to amend the
judgment.

2

RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff respectfully requests the court to vacate or
amend the order to delete references to a Rule 52(b) motion because
no such motion was ever filed.
JURISDICTION TO HEAR MOTION
This matter is presently before the Utah Court of Appeals
on the appeal by plaintiff of this court's order granting summary
judgment to Fidelity.
In Baker v. Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah App.
1988) . The Utah Court of Appeals held that a Rule 60 motion may be
considered by the trial court while the appeal is pending.
ARGUMENT
This court should amend the order entered December 11,
1990 to remove the

language relating to Rule 52(b) for the

following reasons:
1.

Plaintiff did not File a Rule 52(b) Motion.
The order purports to deny a Rule 52(b) motion allegedly

filed by plaintiffs. No such motion was ever filed.

The pleading

filed clearly states it is "objections and additions to proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law" (emphasis added) . Rule 4504 clearly allows such a filing.

The pleading is not labeled as

a motion. Rule 52(b) is nowhere mentioned. At the time of filing,

3

counsel for plaintiff was not aware judgment had been signed and
was attempting to object under Rule 4-504.

See, Exhibit A.

Thus, it is clear there was no Rule 52(b) motion.
2.

If Plaintiff's objections are in fact construed bv the
court to be a Rule 52fb) motion, then the order
complained of was entered in violation of procedural
rules.
If, notwithstanding the argument in Section 1, above, the

court construes plaintiff's objections to be a Rule 52(b) motion,
then the order of December 11, 1990 was entered in violation of the
procedural mandate of Rule 4-501(1) of the Civil Rules of Practice.
If, for the sake of argument, we assume the objections were in fact
a Rule 52(b) motion, then before the motion could be lawfully
submitted to the court for signing, the provisions of Rule 4-501(1)
would need to be followed.
mandatory.

Rule 4-501(1) (d) is explicit and

Before a motion can be submitted to the court for

decision a separate written pleading captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision" with a certificate showing mailing to all parties
must be filed.

The rule is explicit "if neither party files a

notice, the motion will not be submitted for decision."
There was never a notice to submit for decision filed by
defendant Fidelity.

In fact, under Rule 4-501(b), Fidelity's

failure to file a response to the alleged Rule 52(b) motion
precludes them from submitting the matter for decision.

If a

memorandum in opposition is not filed, rule 4-501(1)(b) provides
4

for submission for decision under Rule 4-501(1) (d) only bv the
moving party.
Since the procedure necessary to file and submit a motion
for decision was clearly not followed and in fact Rule 4-501(d) was
violated by Fidelity in submitting the order for signature, the
court should either:
a)

vacate the order and sign an amended order deleting
references to Rule 52(b) and clearly stating that
objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or

b)

vacate the December 11, 1990 Order and require Rule
4-501 to be followed prior to entry of a new order.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the court should grant
the motion of plaintiff and either:
a)

vacate the order and enter a new order deleting
references

to

Rule

52(b)

and

clearly

stating

objections under Rule 4-504 are being denied; or
b)

vacate the order and require compliance with Rule
4-501(1).

DATED this A^/""^"day of September, 1991.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

"~ "EDWARD T. WELLS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AMEND ORDER. fDeBry v. Cascade,
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 34111

SP3-881/jn

6

2-7-^av of

September,

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

i
i

AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD T.
WELLS

vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

,
Civil No. C86-553

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,

• ]

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Edward T. Wells, being duly sworn deposes and says:
1.

I am counsel for plaintiff in reference to matters

related to defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance (hereinafter
"Fidelity").

2.

On or before May 4, 1990, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of

the Utah Rules of Civil Practice, I prepared Objections to Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which had been proposed by
counsel for Fidelity as part of an order granting summary judgment.
3.

I signed the objections on May 4, 1991.

4.

At the time the objections were prepared and signed,

I was not aware the judgment had been signed.
5.

There was no mention of Rule 52(b) in the objections

filed and I had no intent to involve Rule 52(b) because I was not
aware a judgment had been entered.
6.

No

Rule

52(b) motion

has

ever, been

filed by

plaintiff regarding the Fidelity judgment.
7.

I have never received a pleading from Fidelity's

counsel which purported to respond to my objections or to be a
memorandum in opposition to a Rule 52(b) motion.
8.

I have never received from counsel for Fidelity a

notice to submit a Rule 52(b) motion for decision.
9.

I have never received from anyone a notice to submit

for decision under Rule 4-501(1)(d) with respect to the objections
to proposed findings signed by me on May 4, 1990.
10.

I

have

never

filed

objections for decision.

2

a

notice

to

submit

such

DATED this 2 7 ^ ^ d a y of September, 1991.

By: y^>l

^

/

V

I
)

//l'i.

EDWARD T. WELLS

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED TO b e f o r e me t h i s

I)IjTUn^lsJjj

1991,

NOTARY PUBLIC
RESIDING IN:
res:
V

-J

^?FU^
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^ /

I day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
AFFIDA.VIT

OF

EDWARD T.

WELLS.

(DeBzy

v.

Cascade,

et

al.l

was

mailed, postage prepaid, on the ,£__£__ day of September, 1991, to
the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

c/-4«/
SP3-882/jn
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BY

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

i

vs.

]>

REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
AMEND ORDER

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.

]
)

CASE NO. C83-553

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

t

JUDGE PAT BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.

'
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant Fidelity has not disputed any of the facts set out
in the memorandum of plaintiff in support, of the motion to amend
the order centered herein December 11, 1990.
accepted as true.

Therefore, they are

Defendants have not contested the statements

contained in the affidavit filed in support of the motion.

Plaintiff disputes the characterization of "facts" contained
in paragraphs 6 and 7 as follows:
a)

The objections to proposed findings were mooted when the
court entered the judgment.

b)

No formal order was needed.

Defendant's characterization of a "loose end" remaining
is spurious.

No motion was pending.

The court had not

been asked to do anything to the judgment entered on May
2, 1990.

The letters referred to (Exhibit C & D) were

not delivered to counsel.
ARGUMENT
Counsel

for defendants

have cited

to the

court no

legal

authority and have filed no affidavits to support their position.
The entire basis for the language which is objected to in the
December 11, 1990 order is defense counsel's "characterization" of
plaintiff's objections to the proposed findings as a Rule 52(b)
motion.
A motion is defined in law as an application to a court for an
order.

E.g. . Wolff v. Wolff, 25 Or. App. 739, 550 P. 2d 1388

(1976); Iverson v. Second Judicial District Court. 66 Nev. 145, 206
P.2d 755 (1949); Williams v. Denning. 260 N.C. 539, 133 S.E.2d 150,
151 (1963); Schoenberg v. Benner. 59 Cal. Rptr. 359, 367 (Cal. App.
1967); Behm v. Division of Administration. 275 So.2d 545, 547 (Fla.
2

App. 1973); State v. James. 347 S.W.2d 211, 216 (Mo. 1961); Elliot
v. Elliot. 797 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. App. 1990); People v. Thomas.
34 111. App.3d 1002, 341 N.E.2d 178, 182 (1976); see, Black's Law
Dictionary at 1164 (4th ed. 1951).
Counsel cannot convert objections to proposed findings into a
Rule 52(b) motion merely because part of the "objections" was a
suggestion additional findings were needed. Rule 52(b) is nowhere
mentioned in the pleading filed by plaintiff.
no relief at all, let alone Rule 52(b) relief.
type of relief is sought.
amended.
Id.

Plaintiff asked for
No order or other

There is no suggestion any order be

The pleading is simply and by definition not a motion.

Contrary

to

the

argument

of

defendant

the

pleading

"substantially" cannot be a motion because it seeks no relief and
asks for no order.

Jd.

Thus, the language in the December 11

order is not only baseless, but it mischaracterizes the pleading as
a matter of law.

On its face the pleading is an objection to

proposed findings.

Defendants cite not one case to support their

position.

The cases cited herein by plaintiff defining a "motion"

are representative of the general rule.
Since no Rule 52(b) motion was filed, the questioned language
should be stricken because a court cannot deny a non-existent
motion.

3

POINT II
THE MANNER OF ENTERING THE ORDER WAS
PROCEDURALLY IRREGULAR
Notwithstanding defendants' argument to the contrary, the
entry of the December 11, 1990 order was procedurally irregular and
improper.
Simply stated, the procedure under Rule 4-501 is as follows:
1.

A motion is filed and a supporting memorandum must

accompany the motion unless uncontested or ex parte [(Rule 4501(a)] (the fact no memorandum accompanied plaintiff's objections
argues no motion was intended).
2.

The responding party may file a responsive memorandum

within ten days.
for decision.

If no memo is filed, the moving party may submit

By failing to file a response, the right to submit

for decision is waived.
3.

[Rule 4-501(b)].

If a responsive memorandum is filed the moving party may

file a reply within five days. (Rule 4-501(c)].
4.

If a responsive memo was filed, then five days later,

whether or not a reply is filed, either party may then file a
notice to submit for decision [Rule 4-501(d)].
The reasons why the December 11, 1990 order was irregular and
improperly entered are as follows:
1.

A motion was not filed by definition.

supra.
4

Elliot v. Elliot.

2.

Defendants did not respond pursuant to Rule 4-501(b).

Thus, Rule 4-$oi(c) and (d) do not come into play.
3.

Ever^ assuming, arguendo, defendant could properly submit

the supposed lnotion for decision, defendant failed to follow the
requirements $f Rule 4-501(d) by filing a notice to submit for
decision.
Thus, Rule 4-501 was not properly complied with in this case.
CONCLUSION
The issues raised herein were not before the court when
the order was signed.

The court has signed an order wherein

defense counsel mischaracterized the matter pending before the
court.

As a matter of law, there was no Rule 52(b) motion and

therefore, the court must strike from its December 11, 1990 order
all references to a supposed ruling on a non-existent Rule 52 (b)
motion.

DATED this

<c

" day of

/ j ^ C ^ y v v U ^ , 1991.

HDBERT J.

DEBXY &

ASSOCIATES

Attorneys for Plaintiff

By: /.^^7..-\A<-^ •^r'/
EDWARD T. WELLS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
REPLY TO MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND ORDER. (DeBry
v. Cascade, et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
of December, 1991, to the following:
Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, MCMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-889/jn
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EXHIBIT F

L'i:-w ,

Lynn C. McMurray, #2213
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF
ROBERT J. DEBRY AND JOAN DEBRY,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTIONS AND MOTION TO
AMEND PROPOSED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. C36-553

vs.

Judge Pat 3. 3rian
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general
partnership, et. a_l.,
Defendants.
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, an individual
et. al.,
Defendants.
On Wednesday, March 23, 1990, the Court heard and granted
the motion of Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company
for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Robert and Joan DeBry
Thereafter, on May 2, 1990, the Court entered its Findings of
FIDE-0E3.0R0/LCX/en

Undisputed Material Facts and Conclusions of Law on Fidelity
National Title Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment)
and its Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendant Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company Against Plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and
Joan DeBry.

Thereafter, on May 4, 1990, Plaintiff submitted

Plaintiff's Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.

No party having requested oral argument,

and the Court being fully and duly informed in the premises, and
good cause appearing therefor;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion pursuant to
Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions ,pf*Law be and is hereby denied.
DATED this

//

day of^ November, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

PatB. Brian,
District: Judge
Attorneys for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Order
Denying Plaintiff's Objections and Motion to Amend Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, first-class postage
thereon fully prepaid this

fIDE-0E3.ORO/LCM/em

day of November, 1990, to:

- 2 -

Thomas Grisley
Roy G. Haslam
PARSONS, 3EHLE & LATIMER
#185 So. Stare Street, #700
Salt Lake City, UT 34111

Curtis J. Drake
Michael A. Peterson
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
P. 0. 3ox 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 8 4110

Cascade Construction
c/o Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thurgood

Jeff Silvestrini
COKNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
P. 0. 3ox 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 34147

4455 South 700 East, #300

Salt Lake City, Utah

84107

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 34116

Del Bartel
P. 0. Box 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 300 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101

Dale Thurgood

Randall L. SJceen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., #60
Salt Lake City, Utah 34106

4455 South 700 East, #300

Salt Lake City, Utah
Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejo, California

84107

94859

Craig Peterson
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON
425 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111

Stanley Postma
2571 South 75 West
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Van Ellsworth
1414 Laburnum Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Richard Carling
SHEARER & CARLING
2650 Beneficial Life Tower
36 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

D. Michael Nielsen
Session Place
505 South Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Glen Roberts
WOODBURY, 3ETTILYON & KESLER
2 677 Parley's Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Edward T. Wells
ROBERT J. DeBRY & ASSOCIATES

Darwin C. Hansen
MORGAN & HANSEN
136 South Main, 3th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 34101

4252 South 700 East

Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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EXHIBIT G
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,

i

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NO. C8tf-553
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,

]

Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGE PAT BRIAN

ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Plaintiffs herein appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from
the order of the District Court entered herein on January 2, 1992
denying plaintiffs' motion under Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure to amend an order entered December 11, 1990.
DATED this

day of January, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

EDWARD T . ' WETVLS

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
NOTICE OF APPEAL (DeBry v. Cascade, et al.) was nailed, postage
prepaid, on the s~~J

day of January, 1992, to the following:

Lynn McMurray
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
4 55 East 500 South, #3 00
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT H

FILE_
QUN171992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Robert J. DeBry, and Joan
DeBry,

tyT. Noona,
Wi the Cour.
MSSktoO of Appea..

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Publication)

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No.

v.
Fidelity National Title
insurance Co., et al.,

920269-CA

F I L E D
( J u n e 1 7 , 1992)

Defendants and Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

Edward T. Wells, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Robert J. Dale and Lynn C. McMurray, Salt Lake City,
for Appellees

Before Judges Orme, Garff, and Billings (Law and Motion).
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Both parties have filed memoranda in
response to the motion. We summarily affirm on the basis that
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review.
On March 28, 1990, the trial court granted summary judgment
in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity). On
April 24, 1990, Fidelity hand-delivered proposed findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to appellants7 counsel.
The findings were mailed to all other counsel on April 25, 1990.
On May 2, 1990, Fidelity submitted the proposed findings of fact,
conclusions of law and judgment to the trial court, and the court
signed the findings, conclusions, and judgment.
Five days after the judgment was entered, appellants filed
"Plaintiffs' Objections and Additions to Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law." The document objected to the
findings and conclusions and asserted that specific additional

findings and conclusions should be mac . r- May 22, 1990,
appellants filed a notice of appeal fr_.a tr.= trial court's May 2
order granting summary judgment. On December 11, 19. D, the trial
court characterized appellants' objections as a Rule 52(b) motion
and denied the motion. Appellants did not file a notice of
appeal from the December 11, 1990 order. As a result, this court
dismissed appellants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the
basis that appellants failed to file a new notice of appeal after
the court denied appellants Rule 52(b) motion. DeBrv v. Fidelity
National Title Ins. Co.. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 51 (Utah App. March
18, 1992). On December 21, 1991, appellants filed a motion to
amend the December 11, 1990 order. The court denied the motion,
and appellants filed this appeal.
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated seven
procedural rules in obtaining the December 11, 1990 order.
However, on November 16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel
a copy of the proposed order denying appellants' objections and
additions to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Appellants did not object to the proposed order and did not raise
any of the alleged procedural irregularities. In addition,
appellants' motion to amend the December 11 order did not mention
any of the asserted irregularities but merely sought to delete
references to Rule 52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity committed
procedural violations in obtaining the December 11 order.
We summarily affirm on the basis that the appeal presents no
substantial issue for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(c). We decline
to award attorney fees on appeal.

920269-CA
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EXHIBIT I

s* SLED
JUL 29 1992
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

Mary T. Nocnan
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

ORDER

Case No. 920269-CA

Fidelity National Title, et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition
for rehearing, filed July 7, 1992.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for
rehearing is granted.

The court shall consider the matter

without oral argument.
Dated this 29th day of July, 1992.
FOR THE COURT:

Mary J J Noonan
Clerk\cf the Court

EXHIBIT J

CERTIFICATE O? gAND-DSLIYEflY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was hand-delivered this

'2j£"^Y

cf April, 199 0,

Edvard T. Weils
4 252 South 7 00 East
Salt La>;e Citv, UT 84107

'J
:NC

cm

I hereby certify -hat a true and

> w _ _ ££ w> *-

C w •* •

«.

CIS AND CDKCLI
_-.*

w:

COMPANY ' S MO

ul

SUMXAF.Y JUDGMENT was ~ailed
t m s g.Q

se

firs~ class caii

cay c: Apr:.-, 19 5 0 ~c:

Thcr.as Grz.s^.ey
?.cy G. Kasiar.
.".--•iiw.>i f —^r.~z. a i_-. ..;
=1E5 So. Sta~e Stree~, = 7 00

ccstace rreoaid,

Cascade Construction
c/o Del 3artel
?. 0. 3ox 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Paul
SALT
2001
Salt

Cascade Enterprises
c/o Dale Thrugood
4455 South 700 East, ^300
Salt Lake City, Utah S4107

J--ff Silvejtrini
COENE, RAPPAPORT 7 SEGAL
?. 0. 3cx 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147

Del 3artel
?. 0. 3CX 7234
Murray, Utah 84107

Robert Hughes
50 West 3 00 South, #1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Dale Thurgood
4455 South 700 East, =300
Salt Lake City, Utan 84107

Randall L. Skeen
1245 East Brickyard Rd., =60
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Lee Allen 3artei
110 Merrisac Court
Vallejc, California

Craig Petersen
LITTLE7EELD S PETERSON
425 Soutn 5 00 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

S4E59

Maughan
LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY
South State Street
Lake City, Utah 84115

Stanley Rostra
2571 South 7 5 Vest
Bountiful, Utah 84C10

Van Ellsvcrth
1414 Laburnur. Street
McLean, Virginia 22101

Ricnard Car lino

D. Micnaei Nielsen
Session Place
£05 Soutn Main Street
Bountut—, ^tan 84C_3

5KZ:-S^?.

« CABLING

2 00 Soutn Main Street, =1000
w C — *. _*£.«** C

W _ •» * ^

Glen Roberts

w«-C*

O S «M _

Darvin C. Hansen
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Robert J. Dale, No. 0808
Lynn C. McMurray, No.' 2213
Attorneys for Fidelity National
Title Insurance Company and
Co-counsel for Plaintiff
Canada Life Assurance Company
455 East 500 South., Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT C. DE3RY AND JOAN DESRY
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA*
ON FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AGAINST PLAINTIFFS

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a g e n e r a l
partnership, et. al. ,
Defendants.

CANADA L I F E ASSURANCE COMPANY,
C o n s o l i d a t e d C i v i l Nc. C 3 6 - = = J
Plain-riff,
J u d o e P a - B. B r i a n
vs.

BERT JJ.. DEERY, an
ROBERT

individual

Defendants,

The M o t i o n cf Defendant F i d e l i t y N a t i o n a l T i t l e I n s u r a n c e
Co-par.y ( " F i d e l i t y " )
and J o a n DeSry

for Sumary Judgrer.r a g a i n s t P l a i n t i f f s

(collectively,

"DeSrys")

c a n e en f o r h e a r i n g

t h e a b o v e - e n t i t l e d c o u r t on Wednesday, M a r c h 2 3 , 1 9 5 0 , a t cf

Robert
before
1:00

p.s. / th.e Honorable Pat B. Brian, District Judge, presiding.
DeBrys vere represented by Edvard T. Wells of Robert J. DeBry «
Associates.

Defendant Fidelity was represented by Robert J. Dale

and Lynn C. KcHurray cf KcMurray, Mcliurray, Dale and Parkinson.
Having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
considered the memoranda submitted in support of and opposition to
the motion, having heard the argument of counsel, and being fully
and duly

informed in the premises, the Court now enters the

following:

rrypryGs o?

1.

UNDISPUTED HATERTSW

r^crs

Plaintiffs Robert J. De3ry and Joan DeBry purchased

from Defendant Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade") a building that was
under construction at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
(the "Building"; the property on which the Building was constructed
is referred to herein as the "Property").
2.

While the Building was still under construction,

DeBrys and Cascade agreed to close the sale.
2.

DeBrys and Cascade went to Utah Title £ Abstract

Company ("Utah Title"), a local title company, for the closing (the
"Closing").

At Closing, DeBrys and Cascade signed a number cf

closing documents (collectively, the "Closing Documents").
4.

Cne cf the Closing Documents signed by DeBrys and

Cascade was a closing statement (the "Closing S t a t e a e n t " ) , . dated
Deceaber 13; 1985 (a copy of which i s attached h e r e t o as Exhibit k
and aade a p a r t h e r e o f ) .

Line 4 3 of t h e Closing S t a t e a e n t provided

f o r payment of $79,247.15 t s h : aade t o Cascade a t the Closing.
Line 44 of t h e Closing Stateaent provided for t h e payaent of an
e s t i a a t e d aaour.t of $14 3,092.25 t o s u b c o n t r a c t o r s who had worked on
the

Building

specifically

(the

"Subcontractors").

The

Closing

Stateaent

stated:
The undersigned 3uyer [DeBrys] and S e l l e r
[Cascade] hereby approve t h e foregoing
s t a t e a e n t and authorize Utah T i t l e « Abstract
Ccapany, to conpiete the t r a n s a c t i o n in •
accordance herewith. All i n s t r u a e r . t s r.^v
be delivered er recorded a.nd funds disbursed.
[eaphasis added].

5.

Pursuant t o DeBrys' and Cascade's Closing Stateaent,

Utah T i t l e disbursed the $143,092.25 t o t h e Subcontractors, buz
only $57,3 23.3 4 t o Cascade because the r e a a i n i n g $r1,923.82 was
withheld

froa

Cascade to pay off

encuabrances on the Property

p u r s u a n t t o Cascade's p r i o r w r i t t e n a u t h o r i z a t i o n .

These aaouats

were p a i d p r i a a r i l y fron loan proceeds obtained by DeBrys froa
?.ichar"ds-Woodbury .Jiort gag a Corporation ("Pochards-Woodbury") .
6.

As a f u r t h e r ' p a r t of t h e Closing, DeBrys also

executed a note payable t o Cascade, secured by & t r u s t deed en the
P r o p e r t y i n t h e aaount of $62,500.00, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e balance cf
t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e for t h e 3uilding and P r o p e r t y t o be paid by

DeBrys to Cascade (respectively, the "Note" and "Trust Deed") . The
$62,500.00 Note and Trust Deed were also agreed to in the written
Closing Statement at line 7.
7.

DeBrys received a warranty deed to the Property and

Building from Cascade at the Closing which was recorded.
S.

In connection with the Closing, De3ry, Cascade, and

Utah Title also signed a document entitled, "Escrow and Ncr.-Herger
Agreement"

(De3rys' Escrow Agreement") , which was drafted by

counsel for DeBrys and constituted one of the Closing Docunen-s (a
copy cf which is attached herero as Exhibit 3 and made a parz
hereof) . Therein, DeBrys and Cascade agreed that although the work
cf constructing the Building "has not been fully completed," and
although

"various

issues

concerning

the

construction

remain

unresolved," DeBrys and Cascade "will close on a closing s-ateaent
[the Closing Statement] based upon information which was primarily
suoolied bv Seller."
5.

DeBrys and Cascade furuher agreed in DeBrys' Escrow

Agreemer.u uhat the Nore and Trusz Deed would be escrowed wi-h Utah
Title as security zo DeBrys for (a) Cascade's completion cf the
Building; (b) Cascade's warranty cf wor>:mar:ship and materials for
the Building; and (c) ether unresolved issues.

DeBrys' Escrow

Arreeaenu soecificailv creviced
that the amour.- cf increase in allowances,
tne decrease in m e cnaroe cf any e>:~ras, the
-4-

increase- in any credits; .and the amount paid
by 'Buyers [the DeBrys] for vcrfc which is
Seller's [Cascade's] obligations [sic]
to perform which the parties agree to or which
a Court cr other authority orders Buyers are
entitled to, shall be detracted from The
aaount owed Seller under The Prcrisserv Vote
rthe Notei and Trust Deed. Until the disputes
wiiich exists f sic. ] concerning allowances,
extras, credits and unfinished work are
resolved either by Agreement cr otherwise,
3uvers raav also deduct all funds owed -it
rsic. ] under the warranty described in
paragraph 2 [Cascade's warranty for workmanship and materials] and Seller's obligation under paragraph 7 [Cascade's
indemnification against nechanic's liens]
frcr. the anounts owed under the Promissory
Note and'Trust Deed [emphasis added].

10.

3y letter dated December 16, 1SS5 (three days

after the date of the signed Closing Statement) , Mr. Jeffrey X.
Woodbury ("Woodbury") , attorney for Richards-Woodbury, gave written
escrow instructions to Utah Title on behalf of Richards-Woodbury
(the "?.ichares-Woodbury Escrow Instructions;" a copy of which is
attached hereto as Exhibit C and made a part hereof) . RichardsWocdbury therein instructed Utah Title to clear from the Property
specifically identified liens, encumbrances, and "clouds en the
title" cf the Property listed in Utah Title's commitment fcr a
lender's title insurance policy (the "Commitment"). Utah Title was
expressly authorised in the Richards-Wo cdbury Escrow Instructions
to

use

Richares-Wocdbury' s

loan

proceeds

to

clear

those

encumbrances and "clouds en title."

.* /

II.

The Richards-Woodbury Escrow Instructions further

stated:

A f t e r you have determined t h a t a i l t h e l i e n s
and clouds on t h e -property [ t h e Property]
have been s a t i s f i e d and renoved and that the
Trust Deed described in paragraph 2 above
[ t h e Trust D&ed on the Property s e c u r i n g
Richards-Woodbury's loan t o Debrys] w i l l be
a f i r s t l i e n , vou r.»v disburse the reTnair.ir.c
funds fror: the check described in naraeraor.
S. above [the $485,573.25 check r e p r e s e n t i n g
t h e t o t a l loan proceeds fron Si.chards-Woodbury' s
l o a n t o Debrys] t o Cascade Enter-crises
[emphasis added].

In d r a f t i n g t h e Richards-Woodbury Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s , Woodbury
did not i n t e n d by the words "clouds en the p r o p e r t y " t o r e f e r t o
Cascade's a l l e g e d l y not having a c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i c e n s e or building
? e r r . i t t o c o n s t r u c t t h e 3uiiding.
Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s

Koreoever, t h e Richards-Woodbury

said nothing about Cascade's having cr not

having a c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i c e n s e cr building p e m i t , and s p e c i f i c a l l y
did n o t r e f e r t o any lac): of a c c n t r & c - o r ' s l i c e n s e cr building
p e r r . i t by Cascade as a "cloud" on the P r o p e r t y ' s t i t l e .
12.

DeErys f i l e d t h i s action a g a i n s t Cascade and ethers

f c r t h e a l l e g e d f a u l t y construction of the B u i l d i n g .

DeErys named

Utah T i t l e a s one of nany defendants and a s s e r t e d t h e

following

c l a i r s a g a i n s t Utah T i t l e :
a.

That

Cascade

did

not

have

a

contractor's

Property pursuant to the Richards -Woodbury Escrow Instructions,
that'they are beneficiaries.of those escrow instructions, and that
even though the Closing Statement they signed expressly authorised
Utah Title to disburse, Utah Title should net have disbursed to
Cascade because Cascade allegedly lacked a contractor' s license and
building perait.
b.

That Utah Title orally agreed not to disburse

any_funds to the seller (Cascade) or the Subcontractors until the
Building was completed and approved by DeBrys.
c.

That Utah Title is liable to DeBrys for

allegedly negligently nisrepresenting to DeBrys that it would not
disburse any funds to Cascade and the Subcontractors until the
3uilding was completed and approved by DeBrys.
13.

Since the filing of this acrcion, DeBrys have anendea

their Complaint and added Fidelity as a party Defendant. In their
Fourth Aaended Complaint, which is the governing cosplaint in this
action, De3rys alleged that Fidelity was a title underwriter cf
Utah Title for the purpose cf issuing title policies, and that
pursuant to S2L.-.-22-2 0S, Utah Code Annotated (UC-.) , Fidelity is
liable for Utah Title's alleged nisconduct. §21A-22-303 states, ir

disbursement of funds deposited in escrows,
c l o s i n g s , or settlements with t h e t i t l e
insurance agents in a l l those t r a n s a c t i o n s
where a commitment or binder for cr p o l i c y
or c o n t r a c t cf t i t l e insurance of t h a t t i t l e
insurance company has been ordered, or a
preliminary report of the t i t l e insurance
ccaoanv has been issued cr d i s t r i b u t e d .
14.

After F i d e l i t y vas brought i n t o t h i s action as a

p a r t y Defendant by DeBrys, Utah T i t l e filed^ s Chapter 11 3arJ:ruptcy
p e t i t i o n , which was l a t e r converted to a Chapter 7.

The Chapter 7

proceeding i s s t i l l pending.
15.

Robert DeBry was at a l l t i n e s r e l e v a n t an attorney

l i c e n s e d t o p r a c t i c e law in the S t a t s of Utah.

The DeBrys were

a l s o r e p r e s e n t e d by other counsel at the Closing who drafted soma
cf t h e Closing Documents, including De3ry's Escrow Agreement.
15.

F i d e l i t y ' s Motion for Summ2.ry Judgment was f i l e d

a f t e r t h e discovery cu--off date in the a b o v e - e n t i t l e d action.

Based cr. the foregoing undisputed m a t e r i a l f a c t s ,
Court hereby e n t e r s the following conclusions cf law:

1.

Any leek cf a c o n t r a c t o r ' s l i c e n s e cr building

permit by Cascade did net create a cloud en t h e t i t l e t o the
Prooertv.

the

2.

Neither' -the Deceaber" 16,

1985

Richards-woodbury

Escrow I n s t r u c t i o n s nor any of the Closing Docuaents required Utah
T i t l e t o d e t u r a i n e whether Cascade had a - c o n t r a c t o r ' s license cr a
building perait.
3.

There i s no a r b i g u i t y i n t h e Closing Docuaents,

i n c l u d i n g without l i a i t a t i o n i:- the Closing S t a t e a e n t cr DeBrys'
Escrow Agreeaent.

If t h e r e were any a a b i g u i t i e s in DeBrys' Escrow

Agreement, they would be construed agair.su DeErys, who prepared the
docuaenu.
4.

The alleged aabiguity a s s e r t e d by DeErys v i t h

r e s p e c u t o l i n e 44 of the Closing S t a t e a e n t i s e a s i l y
reconciled,

clarified,

and consurued by reference t o t h e Closing Docuaenus

t h e a s e l v e s without t h e need for any p a r o l evidence.
5.

The Closing Docuaenus a u t h o r i z e d i a a e d i a t e

d i s b u r s e a e n u of the aaounus due Subconuracucrs ( l i n e 44 cf the
•Closing S t a t e a e n t ) and the balance owing uo S e l l e r ( l i n e 43 of the
Closing Staueaer.u) wiuhouu further approval by DeBrys.

The c r a l

a g r s e a e n u s a l l e g e d by DeBrys are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the written
Closing

Docuaents,

and the parol

evidence

rule

prohibits

the

i n t r o d u c t i o n cf any evidence of such i n c o n s i s t e n t cral. agreements.
6.

The Deceaber

IS,

19S5

Richards-Woodbury

Escrcw

I n s t r u c t i o n s were intended to p r c t e c t soaeone o t h e r than DeBrys.
DeErys a r e not t h i r d - p a r t y b e n e f i c i a r i e s cf t h e Deceaber 15, 19£5
P.ichards-Wccdbury Escrow I n s t r u c t i e n s and have no standing to

assert any alleged violation of those instructions.
7.

There vas no violation of the Closing Documents by

Utah Title, and there vas no wrongful disbursement of funds by Utah
Title in connection with the Closing.
S.

Fidelity is not liable to DeHrys under S2LA-22-30S,

Utah Code Annotated.
DeBrys

in

Utah Title did not breach any duty owed to

connection with the escrow, Closing, or settlement

recardinc the Prcoertv.
S.

There is no genuine issue as to any material fact,

Fidelity is entitled to judgment against DeBrys as a natter cf lav,
and Fidelity's Motion for Summary Judgment against De3rys should be
granted.
10.

As provided by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules cf Civil

Procedure, there is no just reason for delay, and Fidelity is
entitled to the entry, forthwith, of a final judgment in its favor.
Dateo this J

cay cf

:'• ' -. , ,

, 1SS0.

BY THE CDUr.T:
/'

.-zt s. srian
District Court Judce
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EXHIBIT L

. EDWARD T V ^ W E L L S : -"• A34 22"=ZT~~
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attomevs for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East .
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

• 3 ^ ^ " ^

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DE3RY and JOAN DEBRY,
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS
AND ADDITIONS TO PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al. ,
Defendants.

Civil' No. C86-553
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.
Plaintiffs

submit

the

following

objections

and

additions to the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
submitted by defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company.
GENERAL OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings

of

fact

granting of summary judgment.

are

unnecessary

to

support

the

.Mountain States v. Atkin, Wright S

Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Rule 52(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

All that is required in this case is

that the court enter an order declaring its findings that because
it holds as a matter of law there were no disputed facts on
material issues, judgment was rendered for defendant.
There is an extensive record in this case.

As long as

the argument and issues have been raised before this Court, the
plaintiffs should be allowed, on appeal, to use any portion of
the record which supports their position.
SPECIFIC 05JSCTI0NS TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
Without waiving the General Objection just mentioned,
the plaintiffs submit the following specific objections to the
proposed bindings of Fact.
the

plaintiffs

do

not

By making these specific objections,

intend

to

exposition to Fidelity's Motion.

resubmit

or

reargue their

The plaintiffs do, however,

want to identify these issues which they contend are not properly
submitted as findings and/or are disputed in the record.
1.

Regarding•finding number 1, the plaintiffs object

to the language "under construction" on the third line.

The fact

is the building was represented to be substantially completed and
a temporary certificate of occupancy was produced at closing to
T

support~the; claim that with the exception of a' few minor items
set

forth

on

said

certificate, the

building

was

completed.

Plaintiffs never intended and did not believe they were buying a
building which was "under construction."
2.

With respect to finding number 2, the comments to

number 1 above would apply.
3.
object

to

closing
language

With

the

to

characterization

statement
must

respect

be

says.

finding
by

number

defendant

Specifically,

read .together

with

as to what the

plaintiffs

the

approval-of plaintiffs of any dispersals.

4, plaintiffs

language

claim the
requiring

The specific language

quoted is subject to the approval requirement.
4.

Plaintiffs

object

to

finding

number

5 on the

grounds the court made no findings at the hearing regarding the
manner or method of disbursement.
5.

With respect to paragraph 8, plaintiffs object to

the characterisation
court

made

no

of the escrow agreements' meaning.

findings

thereon

and

the

document

The

speaks for

itself.
5.
the

With respect to paragraph 10, plaintiffs object to

characterization

of

the

letter

which

speaks

for itself.

Furthermore, the loan proceeds at that point belonged to DeSrys
and such finding should be noted.

7.

There is a disputed fact issue

as

to the alleced

intent of the Woodbury escrow instructions which should be noted
in the findings.
8.

With respect to paragraph 12(b), it was and is the

position of plaintiffs that the agreement j^t to disperse was
bcth oral and in writing and the writing is evidenced by the
language of the closing statement.
5.
should

show

With
that

irespect to paragraph
plaintiffs'

claims

12(c),

included

the
the

language
negligent

disburse! of the escrowed monies.
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The propose^ Conclusions of Law contain unnecessary and
inappropriate restatement of the facts upon which the Conclusions
are

based.

Conclusions

position of the Cour^

as

of law should

simply

set forth the

to the law applicable to the facts of

the case.
1.
conclusions.
ambicuous . "

Conclusions
The

legal

of law numbered
conclusion

is

3 and 4 are mixed

"the

content

is not

2.

A specific finding should be included holding that

S 21A-23-308 does not apply to losses caused by negligence as
this finding was specifically made by the Court.
DATED this

day of May, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attornevs for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A34 22
ROBERT J. DE3RY « ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Sait Lake City, UT 84 107
Telephone: (801) 2S2-SS15
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRi
IN AND "OR SALT LAK:• COUNTY, STATE Or UTAH
ROBERT.J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY i
Plaintiffs,

)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

)

Civil Nc. CZS-5S3

)

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

vs.
FIDELITY ]NATIONAL TITLE
1KSURA24CS U w . , t: _ C._ . ,
Defendants.
Notice is her eby S..ver. that ?„obert J. DeBry and Joan
DeDry,

pi.aintiffs

here:.n najnee,

hereby

appeal

to the

Supreme

Court of the State of Utah frcr^ the order of the District Cou—t
granting

su.vjr.ary judgment

in

favor

of

Fidelity

National

Title

Insurance Co. , entered herein on Kav I, i?9 0 and certified bv tr —
District

Court
n c

r* •

as a final order pursuant

to Rule 54(b) cf the

livjl Procedure on May 2, 1 = 50.

DATED this hjjk

cav of Kay, IS30.
A t t o m s *»*s ~ ~< — s' ^ •'-»-.•- ^

0

EXHIBIT N

subjects addressed in the parol agreements. A finding of
integration is, nonetheless, implicit in the trial court's
Findings of Fact.
5.
Fidelity is not liable under 531A-23-308 for Utah
Title's alleged negligent misrepresentation tort.
That statute contains absolutely no language making an
underwriter liable for the torts of its title insurance agents.
DeBrys' common law agency argument against Fidelity in its brief
was not pleaded or argued below, is not supported in the record,
is being raised for the first time on appeal, and is the subject
of a totally separate lawsuit filed by DeBrys. Moreover,
negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on an alleged
misrepresentation of a "future event," as opposed to a
representation of an existing material fact.
IX. ARGUMENT
1.

THIS APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
Two days after the Court below entered Summary Judgment in

favor of Fidelity, DeBrys filed a motion to amend and make
additions to the findings of fact. Before the district court
entered its order denying their motion, DeBrys filed their only
notice of appeal ever filed. Under Rule 4 (bj , Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, DeBrys' notice of appeal has no effect:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court
by any party . . . (2) under Rule 52(b) to
amend or make additional findings of fact,
the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order denying a new
trial or granting or denying any other such
motion . . . A notice of appeal filed before
the disposition of any [such motion] shall
have no effect. A new notice of appeal must
be filed within the prescribed time measured

court disposing of the motion as provided
above [emphasis added].
On December 11, 1990, the trial court denied DeBrys' motion
in an order stating as follows in relevant part:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion
pursuant to Rule 52 (b) , Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend the proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law be and is hereby
denied. (R. 12917; App. Z).
The 30 day period for filing DeBrys' Notice of Appeal thus began
to run on December 11, 1990, and DeBrys' prior May 22, 1990
Notice of Appeal therefore was filed prematurely and was totally
ineffective.
The Utah Supreme Court specifically held in Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen. 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986), that a
notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a post-judgment
motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme
Court.

Also, in Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct.

App. 1988) , this Court held that a post-judgment motion like this
suspends the finality of the judgment, and that a notice of
appeal filed prior to the disposition of such a motion by entry
of a signed order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an
appellate court. Because DeBrys filed their notice of appeal
before obtaining a ruling on their proposed additions to the
findings of fact, their notice of appeal was ineffective to
confer jurisdiction on this Court, and this appeal therefore
should be dismissed.

2.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW ONLY THOSE CLAIMS RAISED IN DEBRYS'
FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT, AND IGNORE THOSE ISSUES NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE IT.

EXHIBIT 0

Robert J. Dale, #0808
Lynn C. McMurray, #2213
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Fidelity National Title
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone (801) 532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY, and JOAN DEBRY, \
Plaintiffs,

;
ORDER

vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Civil No.
Defendants.

C86-553

t

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
i Judge Pat B. Brian
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.

Robert and Joan DeBrys' Motion to Amend Order came on for
hearing before the above entitled court on Friday December 20, 1991
at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Honorable Pat B. Brian, District
Court Judge, presiding. DeBrys were represented by Edward T. Wells
of Robert J. DeBry & Associates, their attorneys, and Fidelity
National Title Insurance, Co. was represented by Lynn C. McMurray,

of McMurray, McMurray, Dale & Parkinson, its attorneys. The Court
having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein, having
heard the argument of counsel, and being fully and duly informed in
the premises and good cause appearing therefore:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Robert and Joan Debrys' September
27, 1991 Motion to Amend Order be and is hereby denied.
Dated this

day of January, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian,
District Court Judge

riD\DEBRY.ord.mh

-

2
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EXHIBIT P

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Robert J. DeBry and Joan
DeBry,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.

*^/
• " .Noonan
^ . . .01 the Court
i-ah Court of Appeals

NOTICE OF SUA SPONTE
CONSIDERATION BY THE
COURT FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION
Case No. 920269-CA

Cascade Enterprises, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This ""case is being
considered for summary disposition pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
10(e) on the basis that the appeal presents no substantial issue
for review. In lieu of a brief, both parties are requested to
file a memorandum, not to exceed ten pages, explaining why
summary disposition should, or should not, be granted by the
court.
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before
May 20, 1992.
DAT^-th

-,3 0th day of April, 1992.

Noonan
Utah Court of Appeals

EXHIBIT Q

F3LED
3UN 41992

EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
Attorneys for Appellants
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915

CL;.'\ - •. 3 Court
ij; ; .;:;
:.._•! Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
)
|
]|

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

vs.
Case No. 920269-CA

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.
Defendant/Appellee.

Pursuant to order of the court filed May 1, 1992, appellant
files this Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Disposition in the
above matter.
INTRODUCTION
This court in its order of May 1, 1992 directed the parties to
brief the issue of whether summary disposition is appropriate in
this case.
summary

Rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, allows

disposition

insubstantial

as

where
not

"the

grounds

to

merit

review

in

for

further

review

are

proceedings

so
and

consideration. . . . "
The

grounds

for

this

case

are

substantial.

Specifically, the issue in this case is whether due process of law
requires a court on a Rule 60 motion to vacate an order entered in
violation of written procedural rules. Moreover, the issues raised
herein are not the same issues raised in the previous case before
the court (DeBry v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. . 182 Utah Adv.
Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992).

(Hereinafter "Fidelity I.")

reasons, this is not a case for summary disposition.

For these

FACTS
The trial court in Fidelity I granted summary judgment to
Fidelity on March 28, 1990.
delivered

proposed

On April 24, 1990 Fidelity hand

findings of fact, conclusions

of

law and

judgment to DeBrys1 counsel (Exhibit A ) .
On April 25, 1990 the same findings were mailed to all other
counsel (Exhibit B ) .
On May 2, 1990 the court signed the proposed findings,
conclusions and judgment (Exhibit C).
On May 4, 1990 DeBrys1 counsel signed objections to the
proposed findings under Rule 4-504 and these were filed with the
court on Monday, May 7, 1990 (Exhibit D ) .
Notice of Appeal was filed on May 22, 1990 (Exhibit E).
On November 16, 1990 Fidelity submitted a proposed order to
Judge Brian for signing (Exhibit F ) .
Judge Brian signed the order on December 11, 1990 (Exhibit G) .
No new Notice of Appeal was filed following the December 11,
1990 order which caused this court to dismiss the appeal in
Fidelity I for lack of jurisdiction (Exhibit H ) .
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS NOT THE SAME AS THE ISSUE
DECIDED IN DEBRY V. FIDELITY NATIONAL INSURANCE CO.
In Fidelity I the issue was whether late filed objections to
the form of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and
judgment could be construed to be a Rule 52(b) motion to amend the
judgment.

This court construed the objections as a Rule 52(b)

motion. In doing so, the appeal was dismissed because a new Notice
of Appeal had not been filed following entry of the order purporting to deny DeBrys1 objections to form as a Rule 52(b) motion.
2

The issue in this case is different from the issue in Fidelity
1.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its

discretion and denied due process of law to DeBrys when it failed
to vacate or amend its order denying the Rule 52(b) motion upon a
showing that the entry of the order was obtained

in direct

violation of numerous provisions of the code of administration and
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
For this reason, summary disposition in favor of Fidelity
would not be warranted in this case.
POINT II
FIDELITY OBTAINED THE DECEMBER 11. 1990
ORDER BY VIOLATING SEVEN SPECIFIC
WRITTEN PROCEDURAL RULES
Fidelity's December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit G) was obtained
following a history of procedural violations as set out below.
1.

Violation of Rule 52 fa) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides:
The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as
provided in Rule 41(b).
The decision on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b) , 56, and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
Following granting of Fidelity's motion for summary judgment,

Fidelity submitted findings of fact and conclusions of law to
support the summary judgment.

This was a violation of Rule 52(a)

because findings and conclusions are not proper or necessary to
support summary judgment.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph

Co. v. Atkin. Wright. S Miles. 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984).

This

uncalled for submission triggered plaintiff to file objections to
the findings, conclusions and order.

3

2.
Violations of Rule 4-504(2)
Utah Code of Judicial
Administration and Rule 6 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4-504(2) provides:
(2) Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and
orders shall be served upon opposing counsel before being
presented to the court for signature unless the court
otherwise orders. Notice of objections shall be submitted to the court and counsel within five days after
service.
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure defines the method of
calculating the time allowed to carry out requirements of the
Rules.

See Exhibit I attached.

Fidelity violated these rules as follows:

The proposed

findings, conclusions and judgment were delivered to plaintiff
April 24, 1990 (Exhibit A) . They were mailed to all other counsel
April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B).

Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), using Rule

6 time computations, the last day for filing objections to the form
of the judgment was May 7, 1992.

Fidelity submitted the order

early in violation of Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 6.

The judge signed

the order prior to the time allowed for objections.

(Exhibit C)

Plaintiffs' counsel prepared and signed objections to the
findings of fact and conclusions of law on May 4, 1990 and they
were filed on Monday, May 7, 1990.

If Fidelity had not violated

procedural rules' and submitted the order early, no question would
have arisen as to whether plaintiffs' objections were a Rule 52(b)
motion.
3.

The confusion was caused by Fidelity's rules violations.

Violation
of
Rule
Administration.

4-504(41

Utah

Code

of

Judicial

Rule 4-504(4) provides:
(4) Upon entry of judgment notice of such judgment shall
be served upon the opposing party and proof of such
service shall be filed with the court. All judgments,
orders, and decrees, or copies thereof, which are to be
transmitted after signature by the judge, including other
4

correspondence requiring a reply, must be accompanied by
pre-addressed envelopes and pre-paid postage.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
No notice of entry of judgment was sent to anyone by Fidelity.
When plaintiffs objections under Rule 4-504(2) were filed on May 7,
1990, counsel was unaware of the May 2, signing of the judgment.
When it was discovered that the judgment had been filed May 2,
1990, counsel assumed the Rule 4-504(2) objections were moot1 and
filed a notice of appeal.
4.

Violation of Rule
Administration.

(b)

4-501 m

of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Rule 4-501(1)(b) provides:
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding
party shall file and serve upon all parties within ten
days after service of a motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation.
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to a motion within ten days after service of
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision as provided
in paragraph (1)(d) of this rule.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:
If in fact DeBrys' objections (Exhibit D) were a Rule 52(b)
motion which was opposed by Fidelity, Rule 4-501(1)(b) requires a
response in opposition within ten days.

Fidelity never responded.

When Fidelity failed to file a written response, it waived any
right to submit the motion for decision.

Violation of this rule

denied to plaintiff notice that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b)
motion was pending on that Fidelity opposed such a motion.
5.

Violation of Rule 4-501flWdK
Rule 4-501(1)(d), Code of Judicial Administration provides:

'A pleading filed out of time has no force or effect.
Rivera v. M/T Fossarina, 840 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1988).
5

See,

(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration
of the five-day period to file a reply memorandum, either
party may notify the Clerk to submit the matter to the
court for decision. The notification shall be in the
form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice
to Submit for Decision." The notification shall contain
a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted
for decision.
Fidelity violated this Rule as follows:
Assuming, arguendo, that a Rule 52(b) motion was pending. If
Fidelity wanted a ruling, Rule 4-501(1)(d) requires a notice to
submit for decision.

If we assume a violation of Rule 4-501(1)(b)

did not preclude Fidelity from submitting the motion for decision,
Fidelity never complied with Rule 4-501(1)(d) which denied notice
to DeBrys that Fidelity thought a Rule 52(b) motion was pending or
under consideration for a decision.
6.

Violations of Rule 4-504(1).
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or
parties obtaining the ruling shall within fifteen days,
or within a shorter time as the court may direct, file
with the court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in
conformity with the ruling.
Fidelity violated this rule as follows:

Rule 4-504(1) allows submission of a proposed order only after a
ruling of the court. Fidelity violated this rule when it submitted
the December 11, 1990 order for signature.

There had been no

ruling from the court and no request for a ruling.

The previous

rules violations had denied notice to plaintiffs that Fidelity
thought there was a pending unresolved motion.

If plaintiffs had

been put on such notice, they would have been aware response to a
Rule 52 (b) motion was underway and a new notice of appeal could
have been timely filed.

6

7.

Additional Violation of Rule 4-504(4).
In addition to the violation of Rule 4-504(4) set forth in

paragraph

3 above, Fidelity

again violated Rule 4-504(4)

as

follows:
Having obtained a signature on the December 11, 1990 order in
violation of procedural rules as set forth above, Fidelity again
violated rule 4-504(4) by not notifying DeBrys of entry of the
order.

This denied to DeBrys a notice which would have triggered

the duty to file a new notice of appeal which would have avoided
dismissal of Fidelity I.
The numerous flagrant rules violations of Fidelity caused the
procedural confusion in the case.

Being seven nonths into the

appeal, counsel was not expecting to receive an ex parte order
which would require a new notice of appeal to be filed.

The small

mistake in plaintiffs office which denied counsel notice of the
submission of the December 11, 1990 order is inconsequential when
compared to the numerous and continued violations of rules by
Fidelity in obtaining entry of the December 11, 1990 order.
Since DeBrys' counsel was unaware of the entry of the December
11, 1990 order, no new Notice of Appeal was filed in Case No.
910329.

Failure to file a new Notice of Appeal resulted in

dismissal of case 910329.

See DeBrv v. Fidelity National Title

Co.. 182 Utah Adv.Rep. 51 (Utah App. 1992).
Immediately upon learning of the December 11, 1990 order,
plaintiffs filed a Rule 60 motion to amend or vacate uhe order to
eliminate references to Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court denied the motion and this appeal was filed.
The net result of Fidelity's rules violations has been to
confer a benefit upon Fidelity when Fidelity I was dismissed

7

because of a procedural technicality.

Thus Fidelity has been

greatly rewarded for violating procedural rules.
Clearly the lower court abused its discretion when it refused
to

amend

or vacate the

December

11, 1990 order

based

upon

procedural violations by Fidelity at a minimum these issues should
be briefed prior to this court rendering a. decision.
POINT III
SUMMARY DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF APPELLANTS MAY BE
APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO VACATE OR
AMEND ITS DECEMBER 11, 1990 ORDER
Almost seven months after notice of appeal was filed in
Fidelity I, supra, Fidelity obtained the trial court's signature on
the December 11, 1990 order. (Exhibit A.) This order was the culmination of numerous specific violations by Fidelity of procedural
rules.

See, Point II, supra.

The procedural violations effec-

tively denied the DeBrys due process of law. Had Fidelity followed
the procedural rules, DeBrys would have had numerous notices and
opportunities to reply to Fidelity's contention that a Rule 52(b)
motion was pending. However, Fidelity did not follow the Rules and
DeBrys were denied notice and an opportunity to respond.
In Drurv v. Lunceford. 18 Utah 2d 74, 76, 415 P.2d 662 (1966),
the Supreme Court held that procedural rules:
[A]re to be liberally construed to effectuate justice,
nevertheless, they were designed to provide a pattern of
regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts
could follow and rely upon. 18 Utah 2d at 76. (Emphasis
added.)
In Llovd v. Third Judicial District Court. 27 Utah 2d 322, 495
P.2d 12 62 (1972) the Supreme Court defined due process of law as:
[A] course of legal proceedings according to those rules
and principles which have been established in our systems

8

of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of
private rights. 27 Utah 2d at 324.
The orderly administration of justice (due process) requires
compliance with procedural rules. Llovd v. Third Judicial District
Court. supra; Scott v. McNeal. 154 U.S. 34

(1894); Drurv v.

Lunceford, supra; Mavland v. State. 568 P.2d 897, 899 (Wyo. 1977).
Procedural rules cannot be changed at the whim of the court or a
party. Mavland v. State, supra. The disregard of procedural rules
by a trial court cannot be countenanced.

Mesa v. Washington State

Department of Social and Health Services, 683 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.
1982) .

Appellate courts routinely reverse trial court rulings

where procedural rules have been ignored or violated. E.g.. Conner
v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. 56 N.C. App. 1, 286 S.E.2d 810 (1982)
review den. 294 S.E.2d 206 (1982); Armstrong v. Lake. 447 N.E.2d
1153, 1154 (Ind. App. 1983); State v. Turner. 10 Ohio App.3d 328,
462 N.E.2d 1250 (1983); Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain. 442 P.2d
187 (Colo. 1968); Schleining v. Estate of Morris, 431 P.2d 464
(Colo. 1967) (en banc); Thomas v. Children's Hospital Ass'n. 535
P.2d 249 (Colo. App. 1975); Motz v. Jammaron, 676 P.2d 1211 (Colo.
App. 1983).
A party has a right to rely on application of the Rules as
written and the court has a duty to enforce the rules as written.
E.g. . Drurv v. Lunceford. supra; Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain,
supra; Motz v. Jammaron. supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co. . supra.

Due process of law requires following the regular

course of proceedings.

Simon v. Craft. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).

In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court sitting en banc stated in
Schleining v. Estate of Morris, supra:
The trial court should have adhered to its own published
rules. The departure here constituted an abuse of its
discretion. 431 P.2d at 466.
9

Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion when it enters an
order in violation of procedural rules.

I_d; see,

Armstrong v.

Lake, supra; Conner v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.. supra; Capitol
Industrial Bank v. Strain, supra.
The test for reversal in this case is abuse of discretion.
Birch v. Birch, supra. If it is an abuse of discretion to enter an
order in violation of procedural rules, then it follows that it is
an abuse of discretion to refuse to amend or vacate an order
entered in violation of procedural rules.

Schleinina v. Estate of

Morris, supra.
CONCLUSION
The lower court abused its discretion by failing to vacate the
December 11, 1990 order due to Fidelity's rules violations.
The issues raised in this appeal are different apart from the
issues before the court in DeBry. supra. This ca..s raises serious
issues relating to the due process rights of the DeBrys to have the
case proceed in the trial court according to the procedures set out
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code of Judicial
Administration.
In the event the court does not grant summary disposition to
appellants,

the

court

should

allow

full

briefing

of

the

constitutional and procedural issues raised by this appeal.
DATED this

7-~ day of June, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY DISPOSITION.
ITION. (DeBry v. Cascade)
was mailed, postage prepaid, on the
following:

Lynn McMurray
MCMURRAY, MCMURRAY DALE & PARKINSON
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3-911.2/jn
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day of June, 1992, to the
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR REHEARING

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
i

VS.

FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INS., CO.
Defendant/Appellee.

Case No. 920269-CA
Category 16

PETITION FOR REHEARING

EDWARD T. WELLS (A3422)
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
ROBERT J. DALE
LYNN C. McMURRAY
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125
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Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

appellants

respectfully

petition

this

Court

for

rehearing.
III.
INTRODUCTION
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the DeBrys
waived their right to object to procedural irregularities.
Slip Opinion, Exhibit M at 2.)

(See.

As a basis for granting summary

disposition, this Court concluded:
[A]ppellants' motion to amend the December 11
order did not mention any of the asserted
irregularities but merely sought to delete
references to rule 52(b).
We therefore
conclude that appellants have waived the right
to assert that Fidelity committed procedural
violations in obtaining the December 11 order.
Slip Opinion at 2.
Rehearing is appropriate in this case because the record
shows that the alleged procedural irregularities by Fidelity's
counsel were in fact raised in the trial court as a basis for
asking the court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the
December 11, 1990 order.
IV.
STATEMENT OF FACTS NECESSARY TO AN UNDERSTANDING
OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED IN THE PETITION
On March 28, 1990, the trial court in this case granted
summary judgment in favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance
Company ("Fidelity") and certified the case for appeal under Rule
1

54(b) U.R.C.P. Twenty seven days later on April 24, 1990, Fidelity
hand delivered Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Judgment to the DeBrys' counsel.

(See Exhibit A, Appendix.)

On April 25, 1990, Fidelity served copies of the proposed findings
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment to all other counsel in
the case. (Exhibit B, Appendix.)
On May 2, 1990, the court signed the proposed findings
and judgment submitted by Fidelity. (Exhibit C, Appendix.)
On May 7, 1990, the DeBrys' Counsel filed objections to
the form of the order as allowed by Rule 4-504, Utah Code of
Judicial Administration.

(Exhibit D, Appendix.)

Upon learning the judgment was signed, the DeBrys assumed
their objections to the form of the order were moot and they filed
a notice of appeal. (Exhibit E, Appendix.)

For the next seven

months it appears Fidelity also assumed the objections were moot,
since it filed no pleadings related to resolution of a Rule 52(b)
motion.
Approximately seven months later, Fidelity, ex parte.
obtained the signature of the trial court on an order which purported to deny a Rule 52 (b) motion to alter or amend the May 2,
1990 judgment. (Exhibit F, Appendix.)
Due to a filing error, counsel for the DeBrys was unaware
the December 11, 1990 order (Exhibit F) had been sent to the court.
See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, Appendix, at para. 2.
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Being unaware of the entry of the December 11, 1990
order, (Exhibit F) the DeBrys did not file a new notice of appeal.
Eight months later, when Fidelity filed its brief in the
Court of Appeals, it then claimed the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to hear the DeBrys' appeal on its merits because there
was no notice of appeal filed following entry of the December 11,
1990 Order. (Exhibit F.)
of Appeals at Point I.

See. Appellee's Brief filed in the Court
(Exhibit H.)

Upon receipt of appellee's brief, counsel for the DeBrys
first became aware that the December 11,1990 order had been signed
and entered.1

Counsel then filed a motion with the district court

asking the trial court to delete references to Rule 52(b) from the
order or to vacate the order.

(Exhibit I, Appendix.)

The memorandum filed with the motion, pursuant to Rule 4501 (Exhibit J, Appendix), argued procedural irregularities as a
basis for the relief sought by the DeBrys.
The issue of procedural irregularities was again raised
in the reply memorandum filed in the trial court.

(Exhibit K,

Appendix.)
At oral argument on the motion, the court was informed
that a filing error had denied to counsel notice that Fidelity had
'While it is true a copy of the proposed December 11, 1990
order was mailed to counsel on November 16, 1990, a filing mistake
at counsel•s office resulted in counsel not seeing the proposed
order prior to filing and counsel was never aware the order was
proposed or signed. (See Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Ex. G.)
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submitted the December 11 order for signature by the court.

See,

Affidavit of Edward T. Wells, Exhibit G, at para. 5(a).
Counsel argued to the trial court at oral argument that
had Fidelity followed Rules 4-501 and 4-504 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration, at least three separate notices would have
come to plaintiff and the filing error would not have denied the
DeBrys the notice necessary to protect their rights to appeal the
December 11, 1990 order.

Id. at para. 5(d).

Because counsel was unaware the December 11, 1990 order
was entered, no new notice of appeal was filed.

The failure to

file a new notice resulted in dismissal of the original appeal
(Case No. 910329-CA) for lack of jurisdiction.

(Exhibit L.)

V.
ARGUMENT
SUMMARY DISPOSITION WAS BASED UPON THE ERRONEOUS
ASSUMPTION THAT FIDELITY'S PROCEDURAL VIOLATIONS
WERE WAIVED BY APPELLANT
This court granted summary disposition based upon an
erroneous

assumption

that

the

DeBrys

had

waived

Fidelity's

procedural defects by not raising them in the trial court.
court stated:
On appeal, appellants claim Fidelity violated
seven procedural rules in obtaining the
December 11, 1990 order. However, on November
16, 1990 Fidelity mailed appellants' counsel a
copy of the proposed order denying appellants'
objections and additions to proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Appellants
did not object to the proposed order and did
4

The

not raise any of the alleged procedural
irregularities.
In addition, appellants'
motion to amend the December 11 order did not
mention any of the asserted irregularities but
merely sought to delete references to Rule
52(b). We therefore conclude that appellants
have waived the right to assert that Fidelity
committed procedural violations in obtaining
the December 11 order.
Slip Opinion at 2, Exhibit M, Appendix.
The foundation

of this Court's opinion

granting dismissal consists of two assumptions.
1)

(Exhibit M)

They are:

The DeBrys had notice of the proposed December 11,
1990 order and did not object to its entry; and

2)

The procedural irregularities surrounding entry of
the December 11, 1990 order were not raised by
counsel

in his motion to

amend- or vacate the

December 11, 1990 order and were not brought to the
attention of the trial court.
See, Slip Opinion at 2.
Both of these assumptions are erroneous.

Counsel's

motion to alter or vacate the December 11, 1990 order was supported
by a memorandum (Exhibit J) which expressly raised the procedural
irregularities.

See, pp. 4-5, Exhibit J.

The reply memorandum

again raised the issue of procedural irregularities.

See. Exhibit

K, pp. 4-5.
The

fact that counsel was unaware

of the proposed

December 11, 1990 order due to a filing error was also raised at
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oral argument on the motions.

See. Affidavit of Edward T. Wells,

Exhibit G at para. 5-7.
Thus, this court's assumption that counsel for the DeBrys
knowingly failed to object to the proposed order of December 11 and
waived Fidelity's procedural errors, has no basis in the record.
The record shows the opposite to be true.
Rehearing should be granted because this court's decision
was based on an erroneous assumption that the DeBrys had waived
Fidelity's procedural misconduct.
VI.
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I

hereby

certify

that

the

foregoing

Petition

for

Rehearing is filed in good faith and not for the purpose of delay.

DATED this

/ - ^ day of July, 1992.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING. (DeBry v. Fidelity) were mailed,
postage prepaid, on the

day of July, 1992, to the following:

Lynn McMurray
455 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

SP3J-039/jn
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EXHIBIT S

INTRODUCTION
The Code of Judicial Administration contains administrative rules and
rules of professional practice which have been adopted by the Judicial Council
and the Supreme Court respectively.
The revision of Article VTII of the Utah Constitution established the Judicial Council as a Constitutional entity and identified the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court as the Presiding Officer of the Council and Chief Administrative Officer of the judiciary. The revision also designated the membership of
the Council and empowered the Council with the authority to adopt rules for
the administration of the judiciary.
Section 4 of Article VIII accomplished important changes in the Supreme
Court's rulemaking authority as well. Section 4 authorizes the Court to adopt
rules of procedure and evidence for the courts of the state and to manage, by
rule, the appellate process, the practice of law and the performance of judicial
duties by senior judges and justices and judges pro tempore.
The significance of these changes is that the Judicial Council and the Supreme Court now have the tools to manage their own affairs and to enhance
their status as a co-equal branch of government. Yet, to fully realize these
goals and to simplify the practice of law, the adoption of uniform rules was
necessary. Historically, hundreds of administrative rules have been adopted
by various judicial entities in a myriad of different forms. The Supreme Court
and legislature have adopted rules of procedure and evidence, the Judicial
Council has adopted resolutions, the district and circuit courts have adopted
Rules of Practice and Supplemental Rules of Practice and the local courts
have adopted administrative orders, general orders and minute entries, all of
which govern court practice and procedure.
This proliferation of rules created confusion as to which entity had authority for setting judicial policy and procedure and resulted in contradictory,duplicative and inconsistent court practice and procedure. In an effort to eliminate this confusion, the Judicial Council approved a plan for the development
and adoption of the Code of Judicial Administration. The Code consolidates
into a single publication all of the administrative rules and rules of practice
which have previously been adopted by the Judicial Council, the Boards of
Judges and the local courts and the rules of professional practice which have
been adopted by the Supreme Court. The rules have been reviewed by the
Supreme Court, the Judicial Council and the Boards of Judges prior to publication and, where appropriate, modified or repealed to conform with existing
legislation, Rules of Procedure or preferred practice. Some of the rules contained in the Code are procedural in nature and, although adopted by the
Council for publication, have been referred to the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee for study and adoption as Supreme Court Rules of Procedure.
Judicial Council Rules.
The first part of the Code is entitled Rules of Judicial Administration and
contains the first ten chapters of the Code. Chapters One through Four contain the rules adopted by the Judicial Council and govern the organization
and procedures of the Council and the administration and operation of the
courts generally. These rules are initiated and approved by the Judicial Council and then each rule is distributed to all persons or agencies affected by the
rule for a 45-day public comment period. Upon expiration of the comment
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period, the Council reviews the comments, makes appropriate modifications to
the rules based upon the comments received and gives final approval to the
rules.
Chapters 5 through 9 of the Code contain the rules governing each level of
court. These rules are initiated and approved by the Boards of Judges and
subject to ratification by the Judicial Council. Rules of the Boards cannot be
inconsistent with the rules, standards or goals established by the Council or
inconsistent with law. Although the Boards are not required to publish their
rules for a 45-day comment period, the Boards are required to distribute their
proposed rules to affected agencies and individuals prior to adoption.
Chapter 10 of the Code contains the rules adopted by the local courts which
govern local jurisdictions. Local rules are initiated by the presiding judge of a
multi-judge court or the judge of a single-judge court and are submitted to the
appropriate Board of Judges for review. The Board reviews the proposed local
rule for consistency with the Council and Boards' rules, its potential application to courts of equal jurisdiction or its potential application to all courts on a
statewide basis. If the proposed rule is consistent with the rules of the Council
and the Boards, the Board may approve it as a local rule, adopt it as a Board
rule or forward it to the Judicial Council for adoption as a Council rule.
Supreme Court Rules.
The second part of the Code is entitled Rules of Professional Practice and
contains the Supreme Court's rules governing the performance of judicial
duties by senior judges and justices and judges pro tempore, and rules governing the practice of law. Supreme Court rules are initiated by either the Supreme Court itself or the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Rules
of Professional Practice. The Committee is responsible for proposing new rules
or the modification or repeal of existing rules. Once the Committee has formulated a recommendation concerning a specific rule or set of rules, the recommendation is published for a 45-day comment period. At the expiration of the
comment period, the Committee considers the comments received, modifies its
recommendation, where appropriate, and forwards the recommendation to the
Supreme Court for final action.
The Supreme Court has also established Advisory Committees in the areas
of Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Appellate Procedure, Juvenile Procedure and Evidence. Like the Committee on the Rules of Professional Practice,
these Committees are responsible for studying existing rules and proposals for
new rules and making recommendations to the Supreme Court concerning the
adoption, modification or repeal of a rule or proposal. The rules of procedure
and evidence are contained in the Court Rules volume of the Utah Code.
Appendices.
The final part of the Code of Judicial Administration is the set of Appendices, which contains the Manual of Procedures for Judicial Nominating Commissions, the Rules of Procedure for the Ethics Advisory Committee, Uniform
Fee, Fine and Bail Schedules, Sentence and Release Guidelines, Criteria for
Certification of Court Transcribers, and Records Retention Policy for state
courts.
Rulemaking Schedule.
The Council meets annually in April and May to review proposals for the
adoption, modification or repeal of Council and Board rules and to ratify local
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supplemental rules. Interested individuals may file a written request for the
adoption, modification or repeal of a Council or Board rule with the Judicial
Council, c/o General Counsel, Administrative Office of the Courts, 230 South
500 East, Suite #300, Salt Lake City, Utah.
The Supreme Court's Advisory Committees meet annually in September to
formulate their agenda for the upcoming year. Petitions for the adoption,
repeal or amendment of a rule of procedure, evidence or professional practice
may be filed with the appropriate Advisory Committee, c/o General Counsel,
Administrative Office of the Courts, at the above address, by September 1 of
each year.
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